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It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble.
It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.
 Mark Twain

Abstract
This thesis contains some of the main results obtained during my research activity
in these years, in the Statistical Physics sector at SISSA and in the Quantitative Life
Sciences sector at ICTP.
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction and is kept brief, because each of the following
chapters has a separate introduction containing more details on the diﬀerent problems
that have been considered.
In Chapter 2 several models of wealth dynamics are discussed, with focus on
the stationary distributions that they have. In particular, we introduce a stochastic
growth model that has a truncated power law distribution as a stationary state, and
we give an interpretation for the mechanism generating this cut-oﬀ as a manifestation
of the shadow banking activity.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the issue of wealth inequality, and in particular to its
consequences, when in a system with a power law wealth distribution, economic
exchanges are considered. A stylized model of trading dynamics is introduced, in
which we show how as inequality increases, the liquid capital concentrates more and
more on the wealthiest agents, thereby suppressing the liquidity of the economy.
Finally in Chapter 4, we discuss the issue of complexity and information sensi-
tiveness of ﬁnancial products. In particular, we introduce a stylized model of binary
variables, where the ﬁnancial transparency can be quantiﬁed in bits. We quantify
how such information losses create sources of systemic risk, and how they should
aﬀect the pricing of ﬁnancial products.
The results of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are contained in the following
publications:
 Davide Fiaschi, Imre Kondor, Matteo Marsili and Valerio Volpati, The Inter-
rupted Power Law and the Size of Shadow Banking, PLoS ONE, 9(4): e94237
(2014) .
 João Pedro Jerico, François Landes, Matteo Marsili, Isaac Pérez Castillo and
Valerio Volpati, When does inequality freeze an economy?, J. Stat. Mech.
073402 (2016) .
 Marco Bardoscia, Daniele d'Arienzo, Matteo Marsili and Valerio Volpati, Lost
in Diversiﬁcation, in preparation (2016) .
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Historically, Statistical Physics introduced the idea that the complex phenomenol-
ogy of a macroscopic system can be explained as an emergent process through the
interaction of its constituents, when these are modelled as an ensemble of random
variables following simple rules [1]. The enormous practical advantage of this ap-
proach lies in the fact that a full detailed description of the microscopic dynamics
is irrelevant for the understanding of the collective behaviour. Even extremely styl-
ized models can have rich and non predictable macroscopic emergent properties. The
conceptual breakthrough of this idea is that what should be considered fundamental
- in Science - cannot be reduced to something happening at the scales of elementary
particles, but lies as well in the types of interactions taking place at any scale [2].
More recently, these ideas made their way also through non-conventional physical
systems, both in natural and social sciences. Apart from bringing into the game
very successful and modern quantitative tools (in some cases directly borrowed from
Statistical Physics, in other cases from Network Science or from Information Theory,
just to name a few), the Complex Systems Science has introduced unifying prin-
ciples in areas where the quantitative understanding used to be limited to few speciﬁc
sub-ﬁelds. One illustrative example of this might be the concept of complex adaptive
system, initially introduced to explain the robustness of ecological systems [3], and
then used for the description of the development of language [4] and societies[5], or to
derive principles for the stability of the ﬁnancial system [6] and for business strategies
[7].
In this thesis, I have been mainly interested in the application of these concepts
to economic sciences.
2 Introduction
In the ﬁeld of Economics, quite surprisingly, for many years empirically driven
analyses have been rather marginal. On the contrary, quantitative models borrowed
from classical economic theories have been designed more with the purpose of es-
tablishing the internal consistency of some axioms referred to some ideal capitalistic
dream, rather than to reproduce empirical evidences (see [8] for a partisan manifesto).
Nevertheless, persistent statistical regularities and patterns in empirical data are
frequently observed in many contexts, from stock market returns distributions [9]
to corporate growth [10], passing through urban development [11]. This suggests
that explaining economic phenomena as emergent statistical properties of a large
interacting system should be indeed feasible, as it has been done with encouraging
success in these years [1215].
When these attempts started to become popular, in the middle of the 1990s
under the name of Econophysics, the attention was primarily focused on the analysis
of ﬁnancial markets [9]. Soon after, another direction, closer to Economics than
Finance, has emerged. It studies the distributions of wealth and income in a society
and overlaps with the long-standing line of research in Economics studying inequality.
This research line stemmed from one of the most robust empirical stylized facts
about economic systems, since the work of Pareto, that is the observation that both
the distributions of wealth and income among a group of individuals, as well as the
distributions of sizes of cities and ﬁrms, approximately follow a power law distribution
(called Pareto distribution in Economics) [16, 17]. From the modelling side, a power
law distribution does not require sophisticated assumptions, but it can be easily
reproduced as the stationary state of a plethora of simple stochastic models [1821].
In Chapter 2, analyzing data from the Forbes Global 2000, a dataset containing
the total assets of the world's largest 2000 ﬁrms, we observe that the largest amongst
these ﬁrms show a deviation from Pareto distribution, because of the presence of a
sharp cut-oﬀ in the tail of the power law, which is populated exclusively by banks and
ﬁrms operating in the ﬁnancial sector. We give an interpretation for the mechanism
generating this cut-oﬀ as a manifestation of the shadow banking system [22], and we
propose a measure of the total asset size involved in this system. Furthermore, we
introduce a stochastic growth model that has a truncated power law distribution as
a stationary state, which is able to ﬁt the data surprisingly well, and can provide a
measure of the shadow banking activity through the years.
The debate on wealth and income distributions, in particular related to the sus-
tainability of economic inequalities, has regained much interest recently, in view of
the claim the actual inequality has raised dramatically in recent years, reaching the
same levels of the beginning of the 20th century [23]. To address the problem of the
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consequences of inequality on the eﬃciency of an economy with Pareto distributed
wealth, in Chapter 3 we introduce a simple model of trading dynamics in which a set
of zero-intelligent agents randomly trade a set of goods of diﬀerent prices. In such
a model, we show how as inequality in the wealth distribution increases, the liquid
capital concentrates more and more on the wealthiest agents, thereby suppressing the
probability of successful exchanges, i.e. liquidity.
An interesting role, in the literature of wealth and inequalities, is played by the
exponent of the power law, that it has been measured to be close to unity in many
systems [24]. For ﬁrms size distribution, this exponent is found to be slightly below
one in the Forbes Global 2000 dataset, while it is slightly above one in the US house-
hold wealth distribution [25], and it is even larger for the US income distribution
[26]. As a matter of fact, an economy with a Pareto exponent smaller than one looks
very diﬀerent from an economy for which this exponent is larger than one, the ﬁrst
having the richest agents owning a ﬁnite fraction of the total wealth in the system,
even in the thermodynamic limit of inﬁnite number of agents. As a result of this
wealth condensation, the random exchange dynamics that we introduced completely
freezes in the condensed phase, giving a measure of when inequality is too large to
be sustainable. This is particularly relevant because in the aforementioned datasets
on households income and wealth, the exponents of these empirical distribution have
been decreasing steadily in recent years.
Another very interesting feature that is contained in the Forbes Global 2000
dataset, is the apparent decoupling between the ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial sectors.
In the last two decades or so, ﬁnancial ﬁrms have grown at a rate which is consid-
erably larger than the growth rate of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This phenomenon can be
considered as a sort of ineﬃciency of the ﬁnancial industry to deliver investments
to the real economy. In this respect, a promising direction of research which may
provide clues about the role of ﬁnance in our global economy, is related to the under-
standing of the relationship between the faster growth of ﬁnancial ﬁrms (relative to
non-ﬁnancial ones) and the proliferation of ﬁnancial instruments, as in reference [27].
A diﬀerent type of ﬁnancial ineﬃciency is related to the information processing
of complex ﬁnancial products, considered to be the key factor that lead to the mas-
sive devaluation of structured ﬁnance type of products in 2007, the main trigger of
the global ﬁnancial crisis [28]. Expectations on the future returns of these type of
products can be shown to be sharply dependent on the underlying distribution of the
returns of the individual assets they are composed with. As a result, even when they
are composed of a large number of such individual components, the diversiﬁcation
principle does not apply and the risk of these ﬁnancial instruments remains high.
4 Introduction
In the last chapter of this thesis, we introduce stylized models of binary variables,
in which we can quantify how ﬁnancial products are sensitive on some side informa-
tion, aﬀecting the probability distribution of their components. This leads us to give
some proposal related to how the ﬁnancial industry might increase market eﬃciency
and transparency by creating speciﬁc barcodes for ﬁnancial products [29].
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Power Law, Interrupted
Power law distributions arise very often, in a large number of surprising empirical
regularities in Economics and Finance. In particular, the distributions of wealth and
ﬁrms sizes, are very often in the literature found to follow power law distributions
(called Pareto distributions in Economics)[16, 17].
Analyzing data from the Forbes Global 2000 dataset, we observe that the largest
global ﬁrms show an anomalous deviation from a Pareto distribution, because of the
presence of a sharp cut-oﬀ in the tail of the power law, which is populated exclusively
by banks and ﬁrms operating in the ﬁnancial sector.
This anomaly in the shape of the top tail of the assets distribution is the starting
point of our analysis, and we discuss it in section 2.1.
From a theoretical point of view, the occurrence of power laws (i.e. Pareto dis-
tributions) in the size distribution of ﬁrms does not require strong assumptions, but
it has been related to proportional random growth (PRG) mechanism [1821] (see
section 2.3). Assuming that a PRG dynamics should hold also for ﬁnancial ﬁrms, we
can calculate the hypothetical distribution of assets in the absence of any anomaly.
Next, we argue that the diﬀerence between this hypothetical distribution and the ac-
tual one can be taken as a proxy for the size of the so-called shadow banking system
(see section 2.2), which has been broadly deﬁned as credit intermediation involving
entities and activities outside the regular banking system (see [30], p. 3), and it is
the subject of much debate in the literature of ﬁnancial regulation [22, 31, 32].
Finally, in section 2.4 we introduce, as a simple generalization of the model pro-
posed in reference [21], a stochastic growth model that has a truncated power law
distribution as a stationary state, which allows a ﬁrst investigation of the determi-
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nants of the observed anomaly.
2.1 A snapshot of the global economy
Financial deepening
If we take the Forbes Global 2000 (FG2000) list 1 as a snapshot of the global economy,
we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial ﬁrms 2 dominate the top tail of the distribution of ﬁrms by asset
size.
In this analysis, we used the asset size, i.e. the total market value of all the
investments that are presented on the balance sheet of a ﬁrm, as a proxy of the ﬁrm
size. Firm size can, and often has been in several studies where detailed data on assets
were not available, also be measured by other variables such as total sales, number
of employees, or market value. However, even though these variables are available
in the FG2000, they can be strongly aﬀected by the ﬂuctuations in market prices,
and by the conditions of labour and other economic fundamentals. Furthermore, for
ﬁnancial ﬁrms in particular, they are not expected to be a good proxy of the actual
size of the ﬁrm.
Even though ﬁnancial ﬁrms are approximately 30% of the ﬁrms that are enlisted
in the FG2000 list in terms of numbers, they account for 70% of total assets in the
2004 FG2000 list, a share that rose to 74% in the 2016 list. On the other side, they
account for approximately 30% of the total sales, proﬁts and market value, a share
that has been roughly constant in the whole period studied.
The predominant role of ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the asset distribution can be described
also by noting how they are placed in the list rank. The highest placed ﬁrm which
is classiﬁed as non-ﬁnancial is General Electric, which ranks only 62nd in the 2016
FG2000 list. This seems to be a recent trend: General Electric was the largest non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrm by asset size also in the 2004 FG2000 list, but then it ranked 22nd.
This trend, in which ﬁnancial ﬁrms dominate more and more the tail of the
distribution, and form the largest part of the total assets in the economy, is called
1The data used are publicly available at http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/ (FG2000). The
FG2000 list refers to the previous year. Thus the 2016 FG2000 list collects ﬁrms according to their
characteristics in 2015.
2we consider as ﬁrms belonging to the ﬁnancial sector all the ﬁrms that in the FG2000 list belong
to the following industries: Banking, Diversiﬁed Financials, Insurance, Consumer Financial Services,
Diversiﬁed Insurance, Insurance Brokers, Investment Services, Major Banks, Regional Banks, Rental
& Leasing, Life & Health Insurance, Thrifts & Mortgage Finance, Property & Casualty Insurance.
Their number ranges from 501 in the 2013 list to 597 in the 2008 list.
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ﬁnancial deepening in reference [33], to which we refer for a discussion on the systemic
implication of the growth in the size of banks.
Figure 2.1 shows the asset size of all the ﬁnancial ﬁrms, and asset size of all
the remaining ﬁrms. According to reference [33] (see Chart 2), data from Bank of
England shows how the ﬁnancial deepening has been started to take place most likely
in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s.
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Figure 2.1: Total asset sizes for the ﬁnancial and the non-ﬁnancial sectors, in Forbes Global
2000 dataset. In particular, in the years before the 2008-09 global ﬁnancial crisis, ﬁnancial
ﬁrms have been growing at a larger rate than non-ﬁnancial ones. The FG2000 list refers to
the previous year. Thus the 2016 FG2000 list collects ﬁrms according to their characteristics
in 2015. Data of 2004 (2005 FG2000) and 2014 (2015 FG2000) are missing from the plot.
The interrupted power law
Besides being remarkable in themselves, the sizes of the biggest ﬁnancial ﬁrms also
display a peculiar distribution. The 10th largest ﬁrm in the 2016 FG2000 list is Bank
of America, with 2.18 trillion of U.S. dollars in assets, which is comparable to the
Italy's gross domestic product ($2.22 trillion). Yet its size is not much smaller than
the largest ﬁrm in the list, Industrial and Commerce Bank of China (ICBC), which
has assets worth $3.42 trillion. This observation contrasts with the aforementioned
empirical fact for the ﬁrm sizes S to follow a power law distribution as
P (S = x) ∼ x−β−1, (2.1)
with some exponent β > 0.
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Figure 2.2 shows that the rank plot of the ﬁrms included in the 2004, 2007 and
2013 lists of FG2000 approximately follows equation (2.1), with an exponent β close
to one, corresponding to Zipf's law [24]. However, such a power law distribution in
rank seems to apply only from the 20th largest company downward, while the upper
tail, which is entirely dominated by ﬁnancial ﬁrms, levels oﬀ. If Zipf's law were to
hold also for the top 20 companies, we would expect ICBC to be ten times as large as
the Bank of America (hence it should have assets worth approximately $21.8 instead
of $3.42 trillion).
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Figure 2.2: Rank plot of the 2004 list (+), 2007 list () and 2013 list (∗) of FG2000 by
asset size. Financial ﬁrms are shown in blue, while the other ﬁrms in red. The straight line
corresponds to Zipf's law and is drawn for comparison.
In fact, we recall that, when a random variable S is distributed with a power law
distribution, the most probable values for the rank ordered ﬁrm sizes S[k] of the k
th
largest ﬁrm, in a sample constituted by N ﬁrms, depend on rank with another power
law dependence. In fact, these most probable values are given by
S[k] ∼
[
N
k
]1/β
. (2.2)
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When a variable is distributed with a power law distribution with exponent β, its
rank ordered statistics depends on rank with a power law with exponent 1/β.
A simple argument to make sense of this can be given shortly. The cumulative
distribution
P (S > x) =
∫ ∞
x
dx′ P (S = x′), (2.3)
is the probability that a ﬁrm has size larger than x. Consequently, the integer value
of NP (S > x) is the expected number of ﬁrms with sizes larger than x, in a sample
of N ﬁrms extracted from the distribution. The kth largest observed value S[k] should
then be given by
NP (S > S[k]) = k. (2.4)
Assuming P (S > S[k]) ∼ S−β[k] yields equation (2.2).
The same truncated power law can be observed also in the more conventional
frequency plot (see ﬁgure 2.3), but the rank plot emphasizes the behaviour of the
distribution in the tail of large ﬁrms.
The occurrence of a power law with a cut-oﬀ is not entirely peculiar of these ﬁrms
size datasets. For instance, in cases in which the sample is not very large, or if the
exponent β is particularly small, an apparent cut-oﬀ could emerge in the rank plot
due to incomplete sampling. Following the analysis of reference [34] (see Chapter 6
in the reference), a reﬁnement of equation (2.2) yields for the most probable values
S[k] '
[
(βN + 1)C
βk + 1
]1/β
. (2.5)
which could be responsible of an apparent cut-oﬀ (visible only in the rank plot)
looking similar to the one in ﬁgure 2.2 .
In other cases, for instance in the distribution of earthquake moments worldwide
documented in the Harvard catalogue (see Figure 6.1 in reference [34]), one can ﬁnd
a distribution which has a bulk well described by a power law distribution (with
exponent β ' 0.7), while the tail for the largest earthquakes exhibits a signiﬁcant
departure that can be described by an exponential tail [35]. This departure is usually
described invoking a change of regime in the mechanism generating the largest earth-
quake, for which the same mechanism that is responsible for the events in the bulk
of the distribution does not hold. The mechanism we are going to invoke to account
for this cut-oﬀ in the tail of ﬁrm size distribution has to do with the shadow banking
system, that we are going to introduce in section 2.2.
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative distribution P (S > x) of asset sizes S for ﬁnancial (left panel) and
all (right panel) ﬁrms in 2003, 2006, and 2012 (2004, 2007, and 2013 of FG2000 lists). The
straight line is obtained as a linear ﬁt in an intermediate range of logP (S > x) vs log x (see
table 2.1).
The bulk of the distribution
Table 2.1 reports the ranges considered in the estimate of the power law distribution,
and the estimate of the Pareto exponent β of equation (2.1) for all ﬁrms in the FG2000
list from 2004 to 2013 (2005 is missing for lack of data, while the analysis has not
been extended to the following years). Quite interestingly, Pareto exponent β peaks
at the beginning of the period and steadily decreases until it reaches the lowest level
in 2007 (2008 list), before the ﬁnancial crisis. Then it increases suddenly in 2008 and
remains relatively stable thereafter. Table 2.1 also reports the estimate of the Pareto
exponent of the distribution of ﬁnancial ﬁrms only, βfin ; βfin is smaller than β but
it exhibits a behaviour similar to β, with the important exception that it starts to
decline again after the crisis.
However, the authors of reference [36] observed that Zipf's law (and the same for
power laws in general) holds as a property of a system as a whole, but it may not
hold for its parts. As such, it is manifest in samples that preserve a form of coherence
(with the whole system), but fails to hold in incomplete samples that account for only
part of the system (see [36]). Our ﬁndings of deviations from a power law behaviour
for ﬁnancial ﬁrms - which are more pronounced than for the whole economy, is not
entirely surprising and it might indicate that the Pareto distribution of asset sizes
should be considered as a property that applies to the whole economy, rather than
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List FG2000 S− S+ β βfin
2004 14.88 665.14 0.926 0.710
(0.0012) (0.0019)
2006 11.02 897.85 0.889 0.678
(0.0005) (0.0013)
2007 12.18 992.27 0.871 0.645
(0.0005) (0.0012)
2008 12.18 1096.63 0.864 0.655
(0.0006) (0.0016)
2009 14.88 1339.43 0.899 0.672
(0.0008) (0.0012)
2010 14.88 1339.43 0.891 0.674
(0.0008) (0.0011)
2011 18.17 1339.43 0.899 0.669
(0.0006) (0.0013)
2012 24.53 1635.98 0.905 0.648
(0.0009) (0.0012)
2013 24.53 1998.20 0.897 0.627
(0.0008) (0.0009)
Table 2.1: The range of assets (in billion $) [S−, S+] where the power law behaviour is
estimated (for the whole sample), and the estimated Pareto exponents β both for the whole
sample and limited to the ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the FG2000 lists from 2004 to 2013 (data for
2005 are not available). From the standard errors of the estimated Pareto exponents (re-
ported in brackets) we can notice how ﬁnancial ﬁrms size distribution show more pronounced
deviations from a power law behaviour.
to a particular sector. This is consistent with empirical ﬁndings e.g. in [24], and
suggests that, in the absence of anomalies, one should expect a hypothetical assets
distribution that would perfectly obey a power law distribution up to the largest
ﬁrms.
But the most interesting aspect of table 2.1 that we want to point out here is that
both estimated exponents β and βfin are less than one for the whole period 2004-2013.
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2.2 Shadow banking
Shadow banking (SB) is a relatively new concept; the term itself is attributed to
McCulley [37]. SB is a term for the collection of non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries
that provide services similar to traditional commercial banks but outside normal
ﬁnancial regulations. During the 2007-08 crisis, which is often described as a run on
the SB system [38], the private guarantee provided by non-bank institutions proved to
be insuﬃcient, and without massive public intervention the collapse of the SB system
would have brought down the whole global ﬁnancial system. The ﬁrst taxonomy
of the diﬀerent institutions and activities of SB was given by Pozsar [39], who also
constructed a map to describe the ﬂow of assets and funding within the system.
The rise of a large part of SB was motivated by regulatory and tax arbitrage, and
as such represented the answer of the ﬁnance industry to regulation, in particular
to capital requirements. In fact, the core activities of investment banks are subject
to regulation and monitoring by central banks and other government institutions.
As a response, it has been common practice for investment banks to conduct many
of their transactions in ways that do not show up on their conventional balance
sheet accounting and so are not visible to regulators or unsophisticated investors.
Irrespective of the shortcomings or merits of the system, the SB has remained by and
large unregulated, its systemic risks implications uncharted, and its connections with
the rest of ﬁnancial system opaque. Indeed, SB is one of the most important issues
on the agenda of ﬁnancial reform [31, 32].
For us, the only property of interest of the SB system is its total volume. Estimates
of its size diﬀer in nature: Gravelle and Lavoie [40] distinguish between two broad
approaches to measuring the SB sector, one which is based on identifying the entities
that contribute to it, and the other based on mapping the activities that constitute it.
They also diﬀer quantitatively, because of the diﬃculty to determine precisely which
ﬁnancial activities should be included in the calculation. For example, the Deloitte
Shadow Banking Index [41] shows a rise of the SB system in the US before 2008, but
then displays a dramatic drop, suggesting that the phenomenon is now over. The
index is built from speciﬁc components which are known to have played a major role
in the crisis, and its decline after 2008 reﬂects the deﬂation of these markets. On the
contrary, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) estimates that SB [...] grew rapidly
before the crisis, rising from $26 trillion in 2002 to $62 trillion in 2007. The size of
the total system declined slightly in 2008 but increased subsequently to reach $67
trillion in 2011 [30].
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Figure 2.4: Comparison between our index of SB, ISB, with the estimate of the size of SB
made by FSB [42] for the period 2003-2012. The reported conﬁdence bands for our estimate
of SB are calculated on the basis of ±2 standard errors in the estimate of the coeﬃcients of
the power law distributions.
The shadow banking index
Here we propose an index for the size of the SB system, denoted by ISB, based on the
idea that, in an ideal economy where the dynamics of ﬁnancial ﬁrms size should be the
same of all other ﬁrms, the power law distribution should extend all the way to the
largest ﬁrms. Since SB is expected to act eﬀectively as a movement of assets outside
the largest banks' balance sheets, and the top tail of the distribution is dominated by
ﬁnancial ﬁrms, we are led to attribute the mass missing from the distribution of asset
sizes to SB. Fitting the middle range of the distribution to a power law (as in the
left panel of ﬁgure 2.3) leads us to a theoretical estimate Sˆ[k] of what the size of the
kth largest ﬁrm should be. Summing the diﬀerence between this theoretical estimate
and the actual size S[k] of the k
th largest ﬁrm, over k, i.e.:
ISB =
N∑
k=1
(
Sˆ[k] − S[k]
)
(2.6)
provides our estimate of the size of the SB system. The sum is limited to the N
largest ﬁrms. We take N = 1000 but the results depend very weakly on the choice
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of N as long as S[N ] is in the range over which the ﬁt is made (Sˆ[k] ' S[k] within this
range).
For comparison, ﬁgure 2.4 reports also the estimated size of the SB system by
FSB [42]. Apart from being of the same order of magnitude, both the FSB estimate
and ISB show a strong rise before the crisis in 2007, a drop in 2008 (much more severe
for ISB), and a growth after 2008, with ISB increasing at a faster pace, especially in
2011.
In reference [40] it is argued that an entity-based approach to SB, such as that
of the FSB, [...] may omit SB activities undertaken by banks that may contribute
to systemic risk. Furthermore, as observed by Adrian et al. [22] [...] the shadow
banking system comprises several diﬀerent entities and activities. In addition, the
types of entities and activities which are of particular concern will change in the
future, in response to new regulations. Along similar lines, Pozsar et al [38] conclude:
[...] the reform eﬀort has done little to address the tendency of large institutional
cash pools to form outside the banking system. Thus, we expect shadow banking to
be a signiﬁcant part of the ﬁnancial system, although almost certainly in a diﬀerent
form, for the foreseeable future. These arguments suggest that the FSB estimate,
as well as other estimates which try to map the SB activity, is likely to provide a
lower bound to the real size of the SB system. ISB may instead be considered as
an upper bound, since it measures the amount of assets that are missing from a
hypothetical economy in which a power law distribution holds across all scales of
asset sizes, but there might be diﬀerent mechanisms, other than SB, which could
account for deviations from it.
In the next section we are going to describe which type of proportional random
growth models (PRG) we are interested in, in order to shed more light on the dynamics
that could have shaped the empirical distribution of ﬁrms asset.
2.3 Stochastic processes of wealth distribution and the expo-
nent β
The ubiquity and stability of these empirical power law distributions (both in Eco-
nomics and in other ﬁelds) lead several researchers to look for mechanisms that are
able to generate such distributions. In particular, power laws can be obtained as
stationary distributions of a very general class of simple stochastic processes, the
proportional random growth (PRG) models - or processes with multiplicative noise.
The simplest PRG model can be deﬁned in terms of the following multiplicative
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recurrence equation, for the ﬁrm size Si.
Si(t+ 1) = ηi(t+ 1)Si(t), (2.7)
with any time independent distribution for the multiplicative noise ηi. Rigorously,
this process does not have a stationary distribution. Taking the logarithms we have
logSi(t) = log Si(0)+
∑t′
i=1 ηi(t
′), hence the size probability distribution at large time
converges to a log-normal, but there is not a steady state. An argument to show that
this is the case can be given by noting that, the variance for the log of the ﬁrms size
distribution at time t is given by (if it exists!) V[logSi(t)] = V[logSi(0)] +V[η]t and
it grows linearly in time without bound.
Nevertheless, at large but ﬁnite time, the aforementioned process has a log-normal
distribution which in several regimes is indistinguishable from an apparent power law
[43]. Additionally, it can be regularized (for instance by adding a friction term to
prevent ﬁrms to become too small) and in such a way one can show how such a
process do have a power law distribution as a stationary distribution, but with a
Pareto exponent β always larger than one (and very close to one if the friction is
small) [17]. As we have seen, the ﬁrms size data in the FG2000 list, in the bulk of the
distribution, are compatible with a power law but with an exponent that is steadily
smaller than one, see table 2.1 .
Bouchaud and Mezard [19] argue that β < 1 can be obtained within models of
PRG with random shocks, by adding trading of assets among ﬁrms if this trading is
restricted in size and happens within a sparse network. In this model, the ﬁrms size
evolution is given by
Si(t+ 1) = ηi(t+ 1)Si(t) +
∑
j 6=i
JijSj(t)−
∑
j 6=i
JjiSi(t) , (2.8)
where ηi is a Gaussian random variable and Jij the amount of wealth ﬁrm j spends
buying the product of ﬁrm i. In the mean ﬁeld model, Jij ≡ J/N for all i 6= j,
with N the total number of ﬁrms, the stationary distribution has a power law tail
with Pareto exponent β that again is always larger than one, and converge to Zipf
(β → 1) when J → 0. In the presence of some sparsity in the trading network, both
on a regular random network [19] or on some diﬀerent complex networks [44], this
dynamics can be studied numerically and the stationary distribution does still have
a power law tail, but now the exponent can be smaller than one.
Malevergne, Saichev and Sornette [21] provide a diﬀerent mechanism of PRG
which can have a condensed phase, by accounting for the entry and exit of ﬁrms
from the system. In this model, ﬁrms evolve independently according to a log-normal
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stochastic process, like the one of equation (2.7), where ηi is a Gaussian random
variable (with drift µ and variance σ). In addition, according to a Poisson point
process at rate h, one ﬁrm chosen at random disappears from the market. Similarly,
new ﬁrms enter the market according to a Poisson point process at rate ν, having
initial size Si(0) = 1. In reference [21] the possibility of an exogenous growth of
economy is considered by having new ﬁrms which appears more often (ν(t) = νed0t)
and with larger initial size (Si(0) = e
c0t). An exponent smaller than one characterizes
an unsustainable economy where the return on investment of the whole economy is
larger then the investments in new ﬁrms (µ − h > d0 + c0), and Zipf's law emerge
as an optimal allocation of resources that ensure a maximum sustainable growth
(µ − h = d0 + c0). In the following we neglect growth (i.e. we take c0 = d0 = 0). It
can be shown that the top tail of the equilibrium size distribution has a power law
shape with a Pareto exponent given by
β =
1
2
[(
1− 2 µ
σ2
)
+
√(
1− 2 µ
σ2
)2
+ 8
h
σ2
]
. (2.9)
This exponent turn out to be independent of ν, which is a parameter that just speciﬁes
how many ﬁrms there are on average in the economy, and can be ﬁxed to be ν = 1
without loss of generality.
The simplest way to understand this result is by considering a continuous version
of the model, for the density of log ﬁrms sizes ρ = P (logS = x). Such a dynamics
can be described by the Fokker-Planck equation
∂tρ = ∂
2
xρ− µ′∂xρ− h′ρ+ δ(x), x ∈ R. (2.10)
The ﬁrst two terms in this equation are the ones which are usually present in a
diﬀusion process, as they are expected for the evolution of the log of sizes, as in
equation (2.7). The last two corresponds to the two Poissonian point processes, the
uniform absorption of ﬁrms and a source in the origin. The diﬀusion constant has
been put to unity, and µ′ and h′ are some coarse grained coupling corresponding to
the microscopic parameters µ and h.
It can be shown (see appendix 2.A) that the stationary solution of this diﬀusive
equation has a power law tail with exponent given by (2.9), provided the boundary
conditions
∂xρ(0
+)− ∂xρ(0−) = 1 (2.11)
ρ(0+) = ρ(0−).
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The ﬁrst of these boundary condition speciﬁes how new ﬁrms are generated in the
origin (S(0) = 1) while the second guarantees the continuity of the solution.
In the next section we introduce a modiﬁcation of this last model, in order to
reproduce the cut-oﬀ displayed by the Forbes data, i.e. in the presence of SB.
2.4 The model: a PRG model with shadow banking
As described in section 2.2, shadow banking is expected to act eﬀectively as a mech-
anism subtracting assets to the largest banks, who are the most targeted by the
ﬁnancial regulators, hence they have the largest incentive in moving assets away from
their balance sheets. A modiﬁcation of the model of reference [21], which reproduce
the observed cut-oﬀ, can be obtained by adding a Poisson point process at rate λ,
in which the largest ﬁrm i∗ in the economy (with size Si∗ = maxi Si) moves a frac-
tion  of its assets outside the regular banking system to the SB system, reducing
its observed size to (1 − )Si∗ . The subtracted wealth is not distributed among the
other ﬁrms, but it is just removed from the system. Such a modiﬁcation produces
an anomalous extremal dynamics for the ﬁrms whose size is among the largest in the
economy, which have a diminished growth because of this mechanism.
Like in the model of reference [21], we could consider the exogenous growth of
the economy, by having new ﬁrms which appears more often and with larger initial
size. Since the Forbes dataset contains only information about the largest 2000 ﬁrms
in the economy, it is not possible to estimate from this data the parameters d0 and
c0. Hence, since we ultimately want to ﬁt the observed empirical distribution with
the present model, we ﬁx d0 and c0 to zero, neglecting growth and just focusing our
attention on the shape of the normalized stationary distribution.
A continuous equation like equation (2.10) can be written by just adding a reﬂec-
tive boundary condition at some position x0, to account for the extremal dynamics
∂tρ = ∂
2
xρ− µ′∂xρ− h′ρ+ δ(x), x < x0 . (2.12)
x0 can be treated as a parameter, and it can found self consistently, after the solution
is found (see appendix 2.A). It can be shown that the stationary distribution has a
bulk which is still described by a power law distribution, with the same exponent β
of equation (2.9), while the tail is characterized by a sharp cut-oﬀ in correspondence
of the reﬂective boundary (see appendix 2.A).
The stationary distribution of such a process reproduces surprisingly well the
observed distribution in the data. Table 2.2 reports a calibration of the parameters
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Year µ σ β h  λ
2005 0.12 0.20 0.89 0.10 0.1 18
2006 0.10 0.24 0.87 0.09 0.1 15
2007 0.15 0.22 0.86 0.13 0.1 20
2008 0.11 0.28 0.90 0.10 0.1 12
2009 0.04 0.21 0.89 0.04 0.1 6
2010 0.11 0.23 0.90 0.10 0.1 14
2011 0.10 0.17 0.91 0.09 0.1 13
2012 0.09 0.17 0.90 0.08 0.1 12
Table 2.2: Estimates of the parameters of the modiﬁed PRG model of the SB system for
the period 2005-2012 based on the FG2000 list of ﬁrms.
of our modiﬁed PRG model based on the FG2000 list of ﬁrms for the period 2005-
2012 (the analysis has not been extended to the following years). We set  = 0.1 and
we located the value of λ that yields the best match between the simulated and the
observed ﬁrm size distributions. µ and σ are calculated by yearly variations of the
ﬁrms' asset size in the data between consecutive years (except for 2005 where we use
data of 2003, instead of 2004 which is missing). Using these values, h is computed
from the estimate of the Pareto index β, inverting equation (2.9). The reported value
of λ is the one that minimizes the distance between the observed and the simulated
normalized ﬁrm size distributions. Speciﬁcally, i) we compute Zk = 〈log (Sk/S0k)〉
with Sk being the k-th largest ﬁrm in the simulation, S
0
k the k-th largest ﬁrm in the
FG2000 list and 〈 · 〉 is the average over 100 simulations. ii) We ﬁnd λ that minimizes
the mean square deviation
∑
k(Zk − Z¯)2/N , with Z¯ =
∑
k Zk/N .
Figure 2.5 shows the quality of our calibration of the model for 2012. The same
ﬁtting procedure was performed for diﬀerent values of ; for  ∈ (0, 0.1) the ﬂux
λ of capital ﬂow into the SB system results independent of . This is reasonable,
because when  is very small and λ very large, wealth is repeatedly drawn into the
SB system from the same ﬁrm (the largest one). The parameter λ, can therefore be
interpreted as a proxy for the intensity of the activity feeding the SB system.
According to the estimate of λ reported in table 2.2, the intensity of SB activity
peaked in 2007 before the ﬁnancial crisis, when the originate-to-distribute activities
implemented by asset-backed securities and other credit derivatives probably reached
their zenith [38]. In 2008 and 2009 the SB activity showed a dramatic fall in agreement
with the sharp decline in all economic activities and the supposed breakdown of the
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Figure 2.5: Comparison between the empirical FG2000 (red crosses) and the simulated
(black bold line) distributions for 2012. Inset: the estimate of λ in the period 2005-2012.
SB system; but from 2010 to 2012 we observe a renewed increase, even though not at
pre-crisis rates. This dynamic is fully consistent with the evolution of the size of SB
system reported in ﬁgure 2.4, being λ a proxy for the intensity of the activity feeding
the SB system. Considering that the largest ﬁrm is of the order of $ 3 trillion in 2012,
our result λ ≈ 1.2 suggests a ﬂow of capital into the SB system that is progressing
at approximately $ 3.5 trillions a year.
2.5 Conclusions and outlook
Based on solid evidence in the literature [17], we consider the Pareto distribution
for asset sizes as an empirical law of an economy. The observation of power law
distributions in Economics is a remarkably solid piece of empirical evidence, dating
back to the work of Pareto [16]. This empirical law arises from a generic mechanism
 proportional random growth  that is expected to work in particular for ﬁnancial
ﬁrms. The actual distribution of ﬁrm sizes, at the global scale, closely follows this
empirical law in the middle range, but deviates markedly from it in the upper tail,
which is populated entirely by ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
We invoke SB as the element that would reconcile observations with the expected
law. This allows us to derive an index that identiﬁes the size of SB with the missing
mass in the top tail of the asset size distribution. This approach resembles the one
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leading astrophysicists to invoke dark matter and dark energy in order to reconcile
empirical observations with the law of gravitation (current estimates suggest that
dark matter and dark energy account for approximately 95% of the total mass in the
universe). Likewise, the observation of a truncated power law in the distribution of
asset sizes, points to the existence of dark assets that account for the missing mass
in the top tail of the distribution.
Our estimate of the SB size is silent about the precise nature of SB activities
and entities, as well as about the mechanisms that generate the observed departure
from the theoretical power law behaviour. The missing mass from the top tail of the
distribution does not necessarily correspond to hidden assets. It may rather refer
to assets being redistributed within the system. The creation of Special Investment
Vehicles in the securitization process is one example of a mechanism that transfers
assets from large banks in the top tail to the bulk of the distribution.
The index is based on a simple and robust statistical feature, depending on a
collective property of the economy. It is hard to manipulate and simple to compute,
as it requires only data publicly available.
Haldane [45] recently argued that monitoring and regulation based on a detailed
classiﬁcation of ﬁnancial activities is unlikely to keep pace with the rate of innovations
in the ﬁnancial industry. The increase in complexity of ﬁnancial markets should
rather be tamed by measures based on simple metrics, which are robust to change in
regulation and ﬁscal policy. The index of SB proposed here is a contribution in this
direction.
ISB implicitly attributes SB activities to the largest ﬁnancial ﬁrms which populate
the top tail of assets distribution. It is well documented that the main ﬁnancial ﬁrms
originated most of the SB activities before the crisis [46]. Yet, ISB also crucially
depends on the exponent β, whose estimate depends on the shape of the distribution
in the intermediate range. In particular, ISB is expected to increase if the exponent
β decreases and vice-versa. A comparison between table 2.1 and ﬁgure 2.4 shows
how ISB is (anti)correlated with β and βfin: when the assets distribution gets broader
(i.e. β and βfin decrease), ISB increases and vice-versa. After the 2007-08 crisis, the
correlation of ISB with βfin is much stronger than with β. This is a further indication
that the behaviour of ﬁnancial ﬁrms is at the core of the dynamics of ISB.
On the theoretical side, in section 2.4 we discuss a PRG model reproducing the
observed behaviour of the largest ﬁnancial ﬁrms based on an anomalous extremal
dynamics, by which ﬁrms at the top of the distribution of ﬁrm sizes shift part of
their assets oﬀ-balance-sheet. Within this framework, we estimate the intensity of
SB activity in 2005-2012, which largely agrees with the observed behaviour of the
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SB system. Such an estimate is obtained by comparing the stationary distribution
of the model with the empirical distribution in the FG2000 lists. Such an approach
could be criticized by arguing that we cannot really assume that each distribution
for a given year in the FG2000 lists is a stationary distribution, but instead these
snapshots should be considered as out of equilibrium snapshots of the economy. A
ﬁrst hint that this could indeed be the case is given by the fact that the FG2000
normalized distributions at diﬀerent years look very similar, β and βfin changing only
very little from year to year, while the estimated parameters µ, σ and h change more
pronouncedly in time. Secondly, in the last two decades, ﬁnancial ﬁrms have grown at
a rate which is larger than the growth rate of real economy ﬁrms. In any stochastic
model of wealth evolutions, diﬀerent growth rates among ﬁrms hinder the reaching
of a stationary state. For these reasons, a full dynamical inference of the model over
the data seems to be preferable, with diﬀerent parameters describing the dynamics
in the ﬁnancial and in the non-ﬁnancial sectors.
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2.A A Fokker-Planck equation for the model: with and with-
out shadow banking
We write down a continuous equation for the density of ﬁrms in the model of reference
[21] and in our modiﬁcation with shadow banking (SB). In this model, ﬁrms are
created with Poissonian rate ν with unit size. Firms disappear from the market at
Poissonian rate h, uniformly with no dependance on the size of the ﬁrm. While
they are alive, these ﬁrms experience a log-normal process (drift µ variance σ). As
presented, this model predict a power-law distribution for the ﬁrm sizes. In order
to account for the cut-oﬀ present in the data we add a SB mechanism by selecting
with Poissonian rate λ the richest ﬁrm in the market who decide to move a part of
its asset Si∗ outside the regular banking system, thus reducing its size to (1− )Si∗ .
The model of reference [21]
The following equation, equation (2.10) in the main text, is expected to give a coarse
grained description of the microscopic model, accounting for the evolution of the ﬁrms
(log of the ﬁrms sizes):
∂tρ = ∂
2
xρ− µ′∂xρ− h′ρ+ δ(x), x ∈ R. (2.13)
In this equation, µ′ and h′ are some coarse grained coupling corresponding to the
microscopic parameters µ and h, while the diﬀusion constant (related to σ has been
set to 1 for convenience). Normalizable stationary solutions of the previous equation
are
ρ(x) = Aea+x, x < 0 (2.14)
ρ(x) = Cea−x, x > 0
.
By plugging this ansatz into (2.13), we get
a± =
µ′ ±√µ′2 + 4h′
2
=
√
h′
g ±√g2 + 4
2
, with g = µ′/
√
h′. (2.15)
Without shadow banking, the equation has to be endowed with the two boundary
conditions:
∂xρ(0
+)− ∂xρ(0−) = 1 (new ﬁrms, rate ν = 1) (2.16)
ρ(0+) = ρ(0−) (continuity),
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which are enough to determine
A = C =
1
a+ − a− . (2.17)
In order to compare this result with the one in reference [21], we can perform the
change of variable s = ex so that for large s
ρ(s) =
1
s
1
a+ − a− s
a− ∼ sa−−1. (2.18)
Hence a− should be minus the β exponent of equation (2.9). In fact by ﬁxing
µ′ =
µ− (σ2/2)
(σ2/2)
(2.19)
h′ =
h
(σ2/2)
(2.20)
we get the expected result
β = −a− = 1/2− µ/σ2 + 1/2
√
(1− 2µ/σ2)2 + 8h/σ2. (2.21)
We notice, for further convenience, that the presence of the drift term breaks the
x→ −x symmetry in ρ(x) so that we have
E[x] =
∫
xρ(x) =
g
h′3
(2.22)
The model with SB; a simpliﬁed case, without drift
As suggested by numerical results which show a sharp cut-oﬀ in correspondence of a
given size, the equation to account for the evolution of the ﬁrms with the addition
of the SB mechanism can be the same as before, and the extremal process can be
inserted here as a reﬂecting boundary in the Fokker-Planck. Hence we have:
∂tρ = ∂
2
xρ− h′ρ+ δ(x), x < x0 , (2.23)
with boundary conditions
∂xρ(x0) = 0 (SB cut-oﬀ) (2.24)
∂xρ(0
+)− ∂xρ(0−) = 1 (new ﬁrms, rate ν = 1)
ρ(0+) = ρ(0−) (continuity).
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The position of the boundary x0 is now an unknown of the model, and we are going
to ﬁx it later.
The normalizable stationary solutions now are
ρ(x) = Ae
√
h′x, x < 0 (2.25)
ρ(x) = Be
√
h′x + Ce−
√
h′x, 0 < x < x0
Imposing boundary conditions (2.24) we ﬁnd
A =
1 + e−2
√
h′x0
2
√
h′
, B =
e−2
√
h′x0
2
√
h′
, C =
1
2
√
h′
. (2.26)
The stationary solution ρ(x) that we just found is not normalized, instead∫ x0
−∞
ρ(x) =
1
h′
. (2.27)
In order to normalize it, one should multiply A, B and C by h′
Without any SB mechanism, this distribution is expected to be even for x→ −x,
because we are in a simpliﬁed case with no drift term µ′ = 0. SB induce a shift of
the distribution to the left proportional to some ′, the amount that is subtracted to
the top ﬁrms, and to h′, the probability of subtraction to that given ﬁrm. Imposing
this condition
E[x] = −′h′. (2.28)
We want to compute
∫
xρ(x) and impose it to be equal to −′ (since we use the
non-normalized ρ(x)), in order to determine the unknown x0. We have∫ x0
−∞
xρ(x) =
∫ 0
−∞
1 + e−2
√
h′x0
2
√
h′
xe
√
h′x +
∫ x0
0
e−2
√
h′x0
2
√
h′
xe
√
h′x + (2.29)
+
∫ x0
0
1
2
√
h′
xe−
√
h′x.
The sum of this 3 integrals can be shown to be∫ x0
−∞
xρ(x) = −e
−√h′x0
h′3/2
. (2.30)
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The model; with drift and SB
We consider here the same equation of the previous section in the presence of drift
∂tρ = ∂
2
xρ− µ′∂xρ− h′ρ+ δ(x), x < x0 (2.31)
Again, the normalizable stationary solution is
ρ(x) = Aea+x, x < 0 (2.32)
ρ(x) = Bea+x + Cea−x, 0 < x < x0
with
a± =
µ′ ±√µ′2 + 4h′
2
=
√
h′
g ±√g2 + 4
2
, with g = µ′/
√
h′. (2.33)
The boundary conditions are:
µ′ρ(x)− ∂xρ(x0) = 0 (SB cut-oﬀ) (2.34)
∂xρ(0
+)− ∂xρ(0−) = 1 (new ﬁrms, rate ν = 1)
ρ(0+) = ρ(0−) (continuity).
We ﬁnd
A = B + C, (2.35)
C =
1
a+ − a− . (2.36)
B = −a+
a−
C
ea−x0
ea+x0
. (2.37)
At g = 0 these value are equal to the result of the no-drift subsection. The normal-
ization of ρ(x) is still given by noting that∫ x0
−∞
ρ(x) =
1
h′
(2.38)
We use the same argument of the previous subsection to ﬁnd x0. The integral∫ x0
−∞
xρ(x) =
∫ 0
−∞
Axea+x +
∫ x0
0
Bxea+x + (2.39)
+
∫ x0
0
Cxea−x.
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can be shown to be ∫ x0
−∞
xρ(x) =
g
h′3/2
− a+ e
a−x0
h′2
(2.40)
which turn out to be equal to (2.30) for g = 0 and to the result without the SB
mechanism for x0 → ∞. The position of the reﬂective boundary can be ﬁxed by
inversion of:
a+
ea−x0
h′2
= ′ . (2.41)
Connection with microscopic parameters
We studied the process with diﬀusion coeﬃcient equal to 1 (the constant in front of
∂2xρ). In order to ﬁnd the connection with the microscopic parameters one should
consider the diﬀusion coeﬃcient to be σ2/2.
Hence we can use
µ′ =
µ− (σ2/2)
(σ2/2)
(2.42)
h′ =
h
(σ2/2)
, (2.43)
In addition to these, the parameter ′ that we introduced as a mean displacing that
is due to SB should be
′ = −λ log(1− ). (2.44)
Moving to the notation used in the paper, and keeping track also on a factor h′ coming
from the normalization of ρ(x) we ﬁnd
a+s
a−
0
4h2/σ4
= −λ log(1− ) (2.45)
where s0 = e
x0 . The previous equation can be used to ﬁx x0 when the microscopic
parameters of the model are known. As in the previous cases, the exponents read
a− = −1/2 + µ/σ2 + 1/2
√
(1− 2µ/σ2)2 + 8h/σ2 (2.46)
a+ = −1/2 + µ/σ2 − 1/2
√
(1− 2µ/σ2)2 + 8h/σ2. (2.47)
Inverting (2.45) is easy and one can thus easily compute the full distribution
ρ(s) =
{
Asa+ s ≤ 1
Bsa+ + Csa− 1 ≤ s ≤ s0
(2.48)
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Or, for large s the cumulative distribution
P (S > s) = − 1
a−(a+ − a−)
(
sa− − s
a−
0
s
a+
0
sa+
)
(2.49)
For s s0 this equation shows the same power law exponent of the case with no SB,
controlled by β = −a−. Close to the cut-oﬀ the distribution shows a sharp drop to
zero.
2.B A comment on power laws and criticality
The ubiquity of power laws distributions in both social and natural sciences asks
for a deeper understanding about mechanisms generating them. In section 2.3 we
give a short account of the mechanisms based on proportional random growth, or
multiplicative noise, which is particularly convincing for wealth distribution models,
but it is not appropriate for several diﬀerent power laws arising in language, biology,
earthquakes and so on.
In addition, very often power laws are observed with an exponent β that is very
close to unity (Zipf's law), like in the data on ﬁrms asset presented in this chapter. We
recall that β = 1 corresponds to a critical point in the space of power law distributions,
signalling the condensation transition. In fact, when β < 1, even in a very large
sample, the average properties are controlled by a ﬁnite number of events.
In the models described in section 2.3, the speciﬁc value β = 1 corresponds to a
special point. While in reference [19], in order to attain distribution with a tail β < 1
some sparsity has to be introduced, in the model of reference [21] β = 1 is the point of
optimal sustainable growth. In the more general point of view expressed in reference
[47], Zipf's law is critical, because in an exponential representation of the probability
distribution, it turns out to reduce to a linear relationship between energy, the
logarithm of the p.d.f., and entropy. However, while in the usual context of critical
phenomena, criticality requires the ﬁne tuning of some external control parameters,
in order to poise the system on the speciﬁc critical point, such a mechanism seems to
be missing in these distributions in complex systems. In other words, many of these
distribution seems to be self poised at critical point [47].
To account for this ubiquity in very diverse systems, a series of less speciﬁc mech-
anisms for the occurring of Zipf's law have been proposed in the literature, which
could also be relevant for the present subject of economic distributions. Zipf's law
could be attained in a complex system of interacting objects thanks to some learning
process [48], to the presence of hidden variables [49] or it can be a trade-oﬀ between
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cooperation and competition [50]. Finally, in reference [51], it is proposed that Zipf's
law, as well as power laws in general, can appear even when it is not an inherent
property of the real distribution of a given system, but as a result of the eﬀort of ex-
tracting more information as possible from an incomplete sample, in a regime where
the sampling is poor.
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Chapter 3
The Chilling Inequality
The issue of economic inequalities is central in the present economic [52] and political
[53] debate. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss why it is so, but it is
surely related with the observation that in recent years the levels of inequality have
grown dramatically and have reached the same levels as in the beginning of the 20th
century [23, 25, 26, 52]. The recent availability of highly detailed datasets on income
[26] and wealth [25], that we discuss in section 3.1, shows how empirical household
distributions, similar to ﬁrm sizes ones, are compatible with a power law description.
In this setting, the aforementioned rise in inequality can be described by a decrease
in the Pareto exponent, that has been taking place steadily in the last 30 years, both
for the income and the wealth distribution.
Without clear yardsticks marking levels of inequality that seriously hamper the
functioning of an economy, the debate on inequality very often remains at a qualitative
or ideological level. For these reason, from section 3.2 onwards, we introduce a stylized
model that addresses the issue of the eﬃciency of an economy with high degree of
inequality. In particular, the main goal of the present work is to isolate the relation
between inequality and liquidity in the simplest possible model that allows us to draw
sharp and robust conclusions.
Speciﬁcally, the model that we introduce in section 3.2 is based on a simpliﬁed
trading dynamics in which agents with a Pareto distributed wealth randomly trade
goods of diﬀerent prices. Agents receive oﬀers to buy goods and each of these trans-
action is executed if it is compatible with the budget constraint of the buying agent.
This reﬂects a situation where, at those prices, agents are indiﬀerent between all
feasible allocations.
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The results, summarized in section 3.3 and section 3.4, show that when inequality
in the wealth distribution increases, ﬁnancial resources (i.e. cash) concentrate more
and more in the hands of few agents (the wealthiest), leaving the vast majority
without the ﬁnancial means to trade, resulting in the freezing of the economy.
Our main ﬁnding is that, in the simpliﬁed setting of our model, there is a sharp
threshold beyond which inequality becomes intolerable. More precisely, when the
power law exponent of the wealth distribution approaches one from above, liquidity
vanishes and the economy halts because all available (liquid) ﬁnancial resources con-
centrate in the hands of few agents. This provides a precise, quantitative measure of
when inequality becomes too much.
3.1 Inequality in the long run
The debate on the sustainability of economic inequalities has a long history, dating
back at least to the work of Kuznets [54] on the u-shaped relationship between in-
equality and development, who discussed how a society with a too large degree of
inequality grows less than a more fair one (at least in developed countries). Following
Kuznets, much research in this ﬁeld has focused on the relation between inequality
and growth (see e.g. [55]). Inequality has also been suggested to be positively cor-
related with a number of indicators of social disfunction, from infant mortality and
health to social mobility and crime [56].
Despite these seminal contributions, inequality has been a marginal topic in most
economic theories, which relegate it more to an ethical issue, though important, than
to one of the main factors concerning growth. The subject has regained considerable
interest recently, in view of the claim that levels of inequality have reached the same
levels as in the beginning of the 20th century [26, 52]. After the global ﬁnancial cri-
sis, and the slow growth of the subsequent period (Great Recession), the prevailing
view on inequality is changing. In the words of Blanchard, former chief economist
at IMF,  as the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial crisis slowly diminish, another trend may
come to dominate the scene, namely rising inequality. Though inequality has always
been perceived to be a central issue, until recently it was not seen as having major
implications for macroeconomic developments. This belief is increasingly called into
question. How inequality aﬀects both the macroeconomy, and the design of macroe-
conomic policy, will likely be increasingly important items on our agenda for a long
time to come  [57, 58] .
Piketty and Saez [26], and Saez and Zucman [25] study the evolution of the
distributions of income and wealth among the US households over the last century,
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and they ﬁnd increasing concentration, of both income and wealth, in the hands of
the 0.01% of the richest.
Figure 3.1 shows the Pareto exponents of the wealth and income distributions,
obtained assuming that both the data in references [26] and [25] are consistent with
a power law distribution
P (ci > x) ∼ x−β, (3.1)
where ci is the wealth (or income) of the of the i−th household. Such an assumption
is justiﬁed with a good agreement down to the 10% of the richest (see the inset in
ﬁgure 3.4 in section 3.5).
The Pareto exponents in ﬁgure 3.1 are estimated by noting that both references
[26] and [25] report the fraction c> of wealth (or income) in the hands of the P> =
10%, 5%, 1%, 0.5%, 0.1% and 0.01% richest individuals. If the fraction of individuals
with wealth (or income) larger than c is proportional to P>(c) ∼ c−β, the wealth share
c> in the hands of the richest P> percent of the population satisﬁes c> ∼ P 1−1/β> (for
β > 1). Hence β is estimated from the slope of the relation between logP> and log c>.
The error on β is computed as three standard deviations in the least square ﬁt. The
quality of the ﬁt is not constant through the years, for instance the data on wealth
better ﬁts a power law distribution after the 1960s (see the error bars in ﬁgure 3.1).
Wealth inequality is much greater than income inequality. While having approx-
imately similar behaviour along the years, the Pareto exponent for wealth is always
clearly smaller than the income one. The exponents β, both for the income and the
wealth distributions, have been steadily decreasing in the last 30 years, reaching the
same levels it attained at the beginning of the 20th century (for wealth, β = 1.43±0.01
in 1917 and β = 1.38± 0.01 in 2012).
Traditionally, data on wealth are less discussed than data on income, since the
latter has always been easier to obtain, due to the fact that taxation in almost every
country is mainly based on labour income. Even from the theoretical side, models
of wealth are conceptually more complicated, mainly because wealth accumulates
gradually over long period of time. However, in the following we concentrate our
analysis on wealth. In the next section, we introduce a model that, rather than
focusing on the determinants of inequality, focus on a speciﬁc consequence of it, i.e.
liquidity, which is the ability of the economy to allow agents to exchange goods.
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Figure 3.1: Pareto exponent β of the income and wealth distribution as a function of time.
Both time series refer to the US. The data on the income distribution is retrieved from [26]
and covers the period from 1917 to 2000, the data on the wealth distribution is taken from
[25] and covers the period 1917-2012.
3.2 The model: a zero-intelligence agent-based trading dy-
namics
The model consists of N agents, each with wealth ci with i = 1, . . . , N . Agents are
allowed to trade among themselves M objects. Each object m = 1, . . . ,M has a
price pim. A given allocation of goods among the agents is described by an N ×M
allocation matrix A with entries ai,m = 1 if agent i owns good m and zero otherwise.
Agents can only own baskets of goods that they can aﬀord, i.e. whose total value
does not exceed their wealth. The wealth not invested in goods
ci −
M∑
m=1
ai,mpim = `i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N, (3.2)
corresponds to the cash (liquid capital) that agent i has available for trading. The
inequality `i ≥ 0 for all i indicate that lending is not allowed. Therefore the set of
feasible allocations  those for which `i ≥ 0 for all i  is only a small fraction of the
MN conceivable allocation matrices A.
Starting from a feasible allocation matrix A, we introduce a random trading
dynamics in which a good m is picked uniformly at random among all goods. Its
owner then attempts to sell it to another agent i drawn uniformly at random among
the other agents. If agent i has enough cash to buy the product m, that is if `i ≥ pim,
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the transaction is successful and his/her cash decreases by pim while the cash of the
seller increases by pim. We do not allow objects to be divided. Notice that the total
capital ci of agents does not change over time, so ci and the prices pim are parameters
of the model. The entries of the allocation matrix, and consequently the cash, are
dynamical variables, which evolve over time according to this dynamics. This model
belongs to the class of zero-intelligent agent-based models, in the sense that agents
do not try to maximize any utility function.
An interesting property of our dynamics is that the stochastic transition matrix
W (A → A′) is symmetric between any two feasible conﬁgurations A and A′: W (A →
A′) = W (A′ → A). We note that any feasible allocation A can be reached from any
other feasible allocation A′ by a sequence of trades. This implies that the dynamics
satisﬁes the detailed balance condition, with a stationary distribution over the space
of feasible conﬁgurations that is uniform: P (A) = const. Alternative choices of
dynamics which also fulﬁl these conditions are explored in appendix 3.A.
In particular, we focus on realisations where the wealth ci is drawn from a Pareto
distribution P (ci > c) = c
−β, for c larger than a ﬁxed cmin, for each agent i. With
cmin and β being two parameters describing our wealth distribution, we let β vary to
explore diﬀerent levels of inequality, and compare diﬀerent economies in which the
ratio between the total wealth C =
∑
i ci and the total value of all objects Π =
∑
m pim
is kept ﬁxed. We use C > Π so as to have feasible allocations. We consider cases
where the M objects are divided into a small number K of classes with Mk objects
per class (k = 1, . . . , K); objects belonging to class k have the same price pi(k). If
zi,k is the number of object of class k that agent i owns, then (3.2) takes the form
ci =
∑K
k=1 zi,kpi(k) + `i.
3.3 Main results
The main result of this model is that the ﬂow of goods among agents becomes more
and more congested as inequality increases until it halts completely when the Pareto
exponent β tends to one from above.
The origin of this behaviour can be understood in the simplest setting where
K = 1, i.e. all goods have the same price pim = pi(1) = pi (we are going to omit the
subscript (1) in this case). Figure 3.2 shows the capital composition {(〈z〉i , ci)}Ni=1 for
all agents in the stationary state, where 〈z〉i is the average number of goods owned by
agent i. The population of agents separates into two distinct classes: a class of cash-
poor agents, who own an average number of goods that is very close to the maximum
allowed by their wealth, and a cash-rich class, where agents have on average the
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same number of goods. These two classes are separated by a sharp crossover region.
The inset of ﬁgure 3.2 shows the cash distribution Pi(`/pi) (where `/pi = ci/pi − z
represents the number of goods they are able to buy) for some representative agents.
While cash-poor agents have a cash distribution peaked at 0, the wealthiest agents
have cash in abundance.
#970
#1000#976
#1
#970
Figure 3.2: Capital composition in an economy with a single type of good, N = 103 agents,
β = 1.8, cmin = 1, pi = 0.01, M ≈ 2.105 and C/Π = 1.1. Points {(〈z〉i , ci)}Ni=1 denote
the average composition of capital for diﬀerent agents obtained in Monte Carlo simulations.
This is compared with the analytical solution obtained from the master equation (green
dashed line) given by equation (3.7). The vertical dashed line at c(1) ' 7.98 = M/Np(suc)1
indicates the analytically predicted value of the crossover wealth that separates the two
classes of agents. Insets: cash distributions Pi(`) of the indicated agents.
These two observations allow us to trace the origin of the arrest in the economy
back to the shrinkage of the cash-rich class to a vanishingly small fraction of the
population, as β → 1+. As we'll see in the next section, when β is smaller than 1
the fraction of agents belonging to this class vanishes as N → ∞. In this regime,
not only the wealthiest few individuals own a ﬁnite fraction of the whole economy's
wealth, as observed in reference [19], but they also drain all the ﬁnancial resources in
the economy.
These ﬁndings extend to more complex settings. Figure 3.3 illustrates this for an
economy with K = 10 classes of goods (see ﬁgure caption for details) and diﬀerent
values of β. In order to visualise the freezing of the ﬂow of goods we introduce the
success rate of transactions for goods belonging to class k, denoted as p
(suc)
k . Figure
3.3 shows that, as expected, for a ﬁxed value of the Pareto exponent β the success
rate increases as the goods become cheaper, as they are easier to trade. Secondly it
shows that trades of all classes of goods halt as β tends to unity, that is when wealth
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Figure 3.3: Left: Liquidity of goods {p(suc)k }Kk=1 as a function of the inequality exponent β
for a system of N = 105 agents exchanging K = 10 classes of goods (pi(k) = pi(1)g
k−1 with
g = 1.5, pi(1) = 0.005, Mkpi(k) = Π/K, cmin = 1 and C/Π = 1.2). Note that all success rates
p
(suc)
k vanish when β → 1+. The curves are ordered from the cheapest (top) to the most
expensive (bottom). The markers are the result of numerical simulations, with error bars
indicating the minimum and maximum values obtained by averaging over 5 realizations of
the wealth allocations (for more details on the simulations see appendix 3.E). Right: for
the same simulations with K = 10 classes of goods, we plot the time averaged cash 〈`i〉
as a function of wealth ci, from β = 1.1 to β = 2. The dashed lines indicate the diﬀerent
prices of goods. Agents with 〈`i〉 below the price of a good typically have not enough cash
to buy it. Cash is proportional to wealth for large levels of wealth (see the upper straight
red dashed line).
inequality becomes too large, independently of their price.
The decrease of p
(suc)
k when inequality increases (i.e. as β decreases) is a conse-
quence of the concentration of cash in the hands of the wealthiest agents. This can
be observed in the right panel of ﬁgure 3.3, which shows the average cash of agents
with a given wealth, for diﬀerent values of β. The freezing of the economy when β
decreases occurs because fewer and fewer agents can dispose of enough cash (i.e. have
` > pi(k)) to buy the diﬀerent goods (prices pi(k) correspond to the dashed lines).
Note ﬁnally that p
(suc)
k quantiﬁes liquidity in terms of goods. In order to have an
equivalent measure in terms of cash that can be compared to the velocity of money,
we average pi(k)p
(suc)
k over all goods
p¯(suc) =
1
Π
K∑
k=1
Mkpi(k)p
(suc)
k . (3.3)
This quantiﬁes the frequency with which a unit of cash changes hand in our model
economy, as a result of a successful transaction. Its behaviour as a function of β for
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the same parameters of the economy in ﬁgure 3.3 is shown in the right panel of ﬁgure
3.4.
3.4 The analytical approach to the stationary state
In order to shed light on the ﬁndings described above, in this section we describe how
to derive them within an analytic approach. We start by dealing with the simpler
case where all the goods in the system have the same price pim = pi, ∀m (i.e. K = 1).
A formal approach to this problem consists in writing the complete master equa-
tion that describes the evolution of the probability P (z1, . . . , zN) to ﬁnd the economy
in a state where each agent i = 1, . . . , N has a deﬁnite number zi of goods. Taking
the sum over all values of zj for j 6= i, one can derive the master equation for a
single agent with wealth ci (see appendix 3.B for more details). The corresponding
marginal distribution Pi(z) in the stationary state can be derived from the detailed
balance condition
Pi(z + 1)
z + 1
M
p(suc) = Pi(z)
1
N
(1− δz,mi) , z = 0, 1, . . . ,mi (3.4)
where mi = bci/pic is the maximum number of goods which agent i can buy with
wealth ci and p
(suc) is the probability that a transaction where agent i sells one good
(i.e. z + 1 → z) is successful. Equation (3.4) says that, in the stationary state,
the probability that agent i has z objects and buys a new object is equal to the
probability to ﬁnd agent i with z + 1 objects, selling successfully one of them. The
factor 1− δz,mi enforces the condition that agent i can aﬀord at most mi goods and
it implies that Pi(z) = 0 for z > mi. Exchanges are successful if the buyer j does not
already have a saturated budget zj = mj. So the probability p
(suc) is also given by
p(suc) = 1− 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
P (zj = mj|zi = z) (3.5)
∼= 1− 1
N
∑
j
Pj(mj) (N,M  1) . (3.6)
In equation (3.5), p(suc) is related to agent i only, and depends on the fact that
agent i owns z objects. When N,M  1, the dependence on z in the conditional
probability becomes negligible (P (zj = mj|zi = z) ' P (zj = mj)), and p(suc) can
be approximated as in equation (3.6). In such a limit, p(suc) can be approximately
considered the same for all agents. This is important, because it implies that for N
large the variables zi can be considered as independent, i.e. P (z1, . . . , zN) =
∏
i Pi(zi),
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and the problem can be reduced to that of computing the marginals Pi(zi) self-
consistently.
The solution of equation (3.4) can be written as a truncated Poissonian with
parameter λ = M/(Np(suc))
Pi(z) =
1
Zi
[
λz
z!
]
Θ (mi − z) (3.7)
with Zi is a normalization factor that can be ﬁxed by
∑
z Pi(z) = 1. Finally, the value
of p(suc)  or equivalently of λ  can be found self-consistently, by solving equation
(3.6).
Notice that the most likely value of z for an agent with mi = m is given by
zmode(m) ≡ argmax
z
P (z) =
{
m, if m ≤ λ
λ, if λ ≤ m . (3.8)
This provides a natural distinction between cash-poor agents  those with m ≤ λ
 that often cannot aﬀord to buy further objects, and cash-rich ones  those with
m > λ  who typically have enough cash to buy further objects.
This separation into two classes of agents was already pointed out in ﬁgure 3.2.
In terms of wealth, the poor are deﬁned as those with ci < c
(1) whereas the rich ones
have ci > c
(1), where the threshold wealth is given by c(1) = λpi = Mpi/(Np(suc)).
Notice that when λ 1, a condition that occurs when the economy is nearly frozen
(p(suc)  1), the distribution Pi(z) is sharply peaked around zmode(m) so that its
average is 〈z〉 ' zmode(m). Then the separation between the two classes becomes
rather sharp, as in ﬁgure 3.2.
In this regime, we can also derive an estimate of p(suc) in the limit N → ∞, for
β > 1. Indeed, we have Pi(z = mi) ' 1−miλ +O(λ−2) for λ mi, so a rough estimate
of Pj(mj) is given by Pj(mj) ' max{0, 1 −mj/λ}. Taking the average over agents,
as in equation (3.6), and assuming a distribution density of wealth ρ(c) = βc−β−1 for
c ≥ 1 and ρ(c) = 0 for c < 1, one ﬁnds (see appendix 3.C)
c(1) '
[
β
(
1− Π
C
)]1/(1−β)
, (3.9)
p(suc) =
M
Nλ
' Π
C
E [c]
c(1)
. (3.10)
Here E [c] = β/(β − 1) is the expected value of the wealth. Notice that E [c] diverges
as β → 1+, but also that within this approximation the threshold wealth c(1) diverges
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much faster, with an essential singularity. More precisely, we note that Π/C < 1,
so that β(1 − Π/C) ∼ (1 − Π/C) is a number smaller than 1 (yet positive). From
equation (3.9), we have c(1) ∼ (1− Π/C)−1/(β−1) →∞. Therefore the liquidity p(suc)
vanishes as β → 1+.
For ﬁnite N , this approximation breaks down when β gets too close to or smaller
than one. Also, E [c] is ill-deﬁned and in equation (3.10) it should be replaced with
〈c〉 ≡ 1/N∑i ci, which strongly ﬂuctuates between realizations and depends on N .
An estimate of p(suc) for ﬁnite N and β < 1 can be obtained by observing that the
wealth c(1) marking the separation between the two classes cannot be larger than the
wealth cmax of the wealthiest agent. By extreme value theory, the latter is given by
cmax ∼ N1/β. Therefore the solution is characterised by c(1) = piλ ∼ cmax ∼ N1/β.
Furthermore, for β < 1 the average wealth is dominated by the wealthiest few, i.e.
〈c〉 ∼ N1/β−1 and therefore p(suc) ∼ 〈c〉 /c(1) ∼ N−1. In other words, in this limit
the cash-rich class is composed of a ﬁnite number of agents, who hold almost all the
cash of the economy. Figure 3.5 (left) shows that the rough analytical estimate of
equation (3.10) is in good agreement with Monte Carlo simulations.
The analysis carries forward to the general case in which K classes of goods
are considered, starting from the full master equation for the joint probability of the
ownership vectors ~zi = (zi,1 . . . , zi,K) for all agents i = 1, . . . , N . For the same reasons
as before, the problem can be reduced to that of computing the marginal distribution
Pi(~zi) of a single agent. The main complication is that the maximum number mi,k of
goods of class k that agent i can get now depends on how many of the other goods
agent i owns, i.e. mi,k(z
(k)
i ) = b(ci −
∑
k′(6=k) zi,k′pi(k′))/pikc, where z(k)i = {zi,k′}k′(6=k).
The detailed balance condition
Pi(~z + eˆk)
zk + 1
M
p
(suc)
k = Pi(~z)
Mk
M
1
N
(
1− δzk,mi,k(z(k))
)
(3.11)
again yields the stationary state distribution (for N,M  1). On the left we have the
probability that one of the zk +1 objects of type k of agent i is picked for a successful
sale (here eˆk is the vector with all zero components and with a k
th component equal
to one, and p
(suc)
k is the probability that a sale of an object of type k is successful).
This must balance the probability (on the r.h.s.) that agent i is selected as the buyer
of an object of type k, which requires that agent i has less than mi,k(z(k)) objects of
type k, for the transaction to occur (here Mk/M is the probability that an object of
type k is picked at random, and 1/N is the probability that agent i is selected as the
buyer). It can easily be checked that the solution to this set of equations is given by
a product of Poisson laws with parameters λk = Mk/(Np
(suc)
k ), with the constraint
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equation (3.2),
Pi(z1, ..., zK) =
1
Zi
[
K∏
k=1
λzkk
zk!
]
Θ
(
ci −
K∑
k
zkpi(k)
)
, (3.12)
with Zi a normalization factor obeying
∑
z1
...
∑
zK
Pi(z1, ..., zK) = 1. Here the p
(suc)
k
corresponds to the acceptance rates of transactions of goods of class k and are given
by
p
(suc)
k = 1−
1
N
N∑
i=1
P
{
zi,k = mi,k(z
(k)
i )
}
(3.13)
As in the case with K = 1, the values of the p
(suc)
k need to be found self-consistently,
which can be complicated when K and M are large.
When the total number of objects per agent is large for any class k, we expect
that λ1, ..., λK  1, and then the values of zi,k are close to their expected values. This
implies that the population of agents splits into K classes, where agents with wealth
ci ∈ [c(k−1), c(k)] have their budget saturated with goods of class k′ ≤ k and cannot
aﬀord more expensive objects (here c(k) = λkpi(k), k = 1, . . . , K and c
(0) = cmin). An
estimate for the thresholds c(k) can be derived following the same arguments as for
K = 1, by observing that when analysing the dynamics of goods of type k, all agents
in class k′ < k are eﬀectively frozen and can be neglected. Combining this with
the conservation of the total number of objects of each kind, we obtain a recurrence
relation for c(k). We refer the interested reader to the appendix 3.C for details on the
derivation, and report here the result in the case of goods with pi(k) = pi(1)g
k−1, g > 1
large enough, with β > 1 and in the limit N →∞:
c(k) '
[
βk −
(
β − βk+1
1− β
)
Π
KC
] 1
1−β
, (3.14)
p
(suc)
k =
Mk
Nλk
' Π
KC
E [c]
c(k)
. (3.15)
In the limit β → 1+ of large inequality, close inspection1 of equation (3.14) shows
that c(k) → ∞,∀k, which implies that all agents become cash-starved except for
the wealthiest few. Since p
(suc)
k ∼ E [c] /c(k), this implies that all markets freeze:
p
(suc)
k → 0,∀k. The arrest of the ﬂow of goods appears to be extremely robust against
all choices of the parameter pi(k), as p
(suc)
1 is an upper bound for the other success
rates of transactions p
(suc)
k . These conclusions are fully consistent with the results of
extensive numerical simulations (see ﬁgure 3.5 in appendix 3.C).
1Note that the term in square brackets is smaller than one, when β → 1+.
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3.5 Conclusions and outlook
We have introduced a zero-intelligence trading dynamics in which agents have a
Pareto distributed wealth and randomly trade goods with diﬀerent prices. We have
shown that this dynamics leads to a uniform distribution in the space of the alloca-
tions that are compatible with the budget constraints.
Unlike traditional models in Economics, in which agents try to maximize an utility
function and the properties of the economy are derived from the equilibrium of the
economy, the point in conﬁguration space in which all agents' utilities are maximal,
the typical properties of our stylized economy are simply a matter of entropy. This
is the main diﬀerence on how equilibrium is intended in Economics and Statistical
Physics. While in the former equilibrium is the solution of a complicated optimization
problem, in the latter it is intended as a statistical ensemble, in which even sub-
optimal conﬁgurations are weighted with a non vanishing probability, giving rise to
entropy which quantiﬁes the relevance of these conﬁgurations. In this respect, the
model presented here is a limiting case where only entropy matters.
The main result of this model is that when the inequality in the distribution of
wealth increases, the economy converges to an equilibrium where typically (i.e. with
probability very close to one) the less wealthy agents have less and less cash available,
as their budget becomes saturated by objects of the cheapest type. At the same time
this class of cash-starved agents takes up a larger and larger fraction of the economy,
thereby leading to a complete halt of the economy when the distribution of wealth
becomes so broad that its expected average diverges (i.e. when β → 1+). In these
cases, a ﬁnite number of the wealthiest agents own almost all the cash of the economy.
The model presented here is intentionally simple, so as to highlight a simple,
robust and quantiﬁable link between inequality and liquidity.
In particular, the model neglects important aspects such as i) agents' incentives
and preferential trading, ii) endogenous price dynamics and iii) credit. It is worth
discussing each of these issues in order to address whether the inclusion of some of
these factors would revert our ﬁnding that inequality and liquidity are negatively
related.
In particular, our model assumes that all exchanges that are compatible with
budget constraints will take place, but in more realistic setting only exchanges that
increase each party's utility should take place. Yet if the economy freezes in the case
where agents would accept all exchanges that are compatible with their budget, it
could be expected to freeze also when only a subset of these exchanges are feasible.
Also the model assumes that all agents trade with the same frequency whereas one
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might expect that rich agents trade more frequently than poorer ones. Could liquidity
be restored if trading patterns exhibit some level of homophily, with rich people
trading more often and preferentially with rich people?
First we note that both these eﬀects are already present in our simple setting.
Agents with higher wealth are selected more frequently as sellers as they own a
larger share of the objects. In spite of the fact that buyers are chosen at random,
successful trades occur more frequently when the buyer is wealthy. So, in the trades
actually observed the wealthier do trade more frequently than the less wealthy, and
preferentially with other wealthy agents. Furthermore, if agents are allowed to trade
only with agents having a similar wealth (e.g. with the q agents immediately wealthier
or less wealthy) it is easy to show that detailed balance still holds with the same
uniform distribution on allocations. As long as all the states are accessible, the
stationary probability distribution remains the same2. Therefore, our conclusions are
robust with respect to a wide range of changes in our basic setting that would account
for more realistic trading patterns.
Secondly, it is reasonable to expect that prices will adjust  i.e. deﬂate  as a
result of a diminished demand caused by the lack of liquidity. Within our model, the
inclusion of price adjustment, occurring on a slower time-scale than trading activity,
would reduce the ratio Π/C (between total value of goods and total wealth), but
it would also change the wealth distribution. If we think of price adjustment as
occurring on a slower time-scale than trading activity, this, within our model, would
have the eﬀect of reducing the ratio Π/C between the total value of goods and the
total wealth, but it would also change the wealth distribution. Since the freezing
phase transition occurs irrespective of the ratio Π/C, the ﬁrst eﬀect, though it might
alleviate the problem, would not change our main conclusion. The second would make
it more compelling, because cash would not depreciate as prices do, so deﬂation would
leave wealthy agents  who hold most of the cash  even richer compared to the cash
deprived agents, that would suﬀer the most from deﬂation. So while price adjustment
apparently increases liquidity, this may promote further inequality, that would curtail
liquidity further.
Finally, can the liquidity freeze be avoided by allowing agents to borrow? Access to
credit, we believe, will hardly improve the situation in line with the results of reference
2 The dynamics changes and thus p
(suc)
k changes, in particular for goods more expensive than
pi(1), the seller is typically cash-rich and thus its neighbours are too. This can induce to have a
liquidity of expensive goods higher than that of cheaper ones. However in the limit β → 1+, it is
still true that cash concentrates in the hands of a vanishing fraction of agents, and there is still a
freeze of the economy.
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[20] and for similar reasons. Allowing agents to borrow using goods as collaterals is
equivalent to doubling the wealth of cash-starved agents, provided that any good
can be used only once as a collateral, and that goods bought with credit cannot
themselves be used as collaterals. This would at most blur the crossover between
cash-rich agents and cash-starved ones, as intermediate agents would sometimes use
credit. This does not change our main conclusion that inequality and liquidity are
inversely related and that the economy would halt when β → 1+. Credit may mitigate
illiquidity in the short term, but cash deprived agents should borrow from wealthier
ones. With positive interest rates, this would make inequality even larger in the long
run. So credit is likely to make things worse, in line with the arguments of Piketty
[23], who observes that when the rate of return on capital exceeds the growth rate of
the economy (which is zero in our setting), wealth concentrates more in the hands of
the rich.
Therefore, even though the model presented here can be enriched in many ways,
we don't see a way in which the relation between inequality and liquidity could be
reversed.
Corroborating the present model with empirical data goes beyond the scope of
our work, yet we remark that our ﬁndings are consistent with the recent economic
trends, as shown in ﬁgure 3.4. The direct measure that quantiﬁes the eﬃciency of
an economy, in our simple model ,is the number of possible exchanges that can be
realised or equivalently the probability that a random exchange can take place. This
probability quantiﬁes the ﬂuidity of exchanges and we call it liquidity in this chapter.
A quantitative measure of liquidity is provided by the velocity of money [60],
measured as the ratio between the nominal Gross Domestic Product and the money
stock and it quantiﬁes how often a unit of currency changes hand within the economy.
In ﬁgure 3.4 we report data on the MZM (money with zero maturity), the broadest
deﬁnition of money stock that includes all money market funds. We refer to [59] for
further details. As ﬁgure 3.4 shows, the velocity of money has been steadily declining
in the last decades.
Our model suggests that this decline and the increasing level of inequality are not
a coincidence. Rather the former is a consequence of the latter. In addition, it is
worth observing that, alongside with increasing levels of inequality, trade has slowed
down after the 2008 crisis. The U.S. Trade Overview, published by the International
Trade Administration in 2013, observes that Historically, exports have grown as a
share of U.S. GDP. However, in 2013 exports contributed to 13.5% of U.S. GDP, a
slight drop from 2012'" [61]. A similar slowing down can be observed at the global
level, in the UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, 2015 ( see page 7 in reference
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Figure 3.4: Left: Velocity of money of MZM stocks (right y-axis) and Pareto exponent β of
the wealth distribution (left y-axis) as a function of time. Both time series refer to the US.
The data on the money velocity is retrieved from [59], the data on the wealth distribution
is taken from [25]. Inset: relation between the fraction w> of wealth owned by the P>
percent wealthiest individuals, and P> for the years 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010. Right:
MZM velocity of money (MZMV, central y-axis) as a function of β, for the same data.
Liquidity, deﬁned as the probability that a unit-money random exchange takes place, (right
y-axis) as a function of β, in the synthetic economy described by our model (see equation
(3.3) and ﬁgure 3.3 for details on the numerical simulations).
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[62]).
More generally, avoiding deﬂation -or promoting inﬂation- has been a major target
of monetary policies after 2008, which one could take as an indirect evidence of
the slowing down of the economy. In fact liquidity, as intended here, has been the
primary concern of monetary polices such as Quantitative Easing aimed at contrasting
deﬂation and the slowing down of the economy, in the aftermath of the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis.
Furthermore, the fact that inequality hampers liquidity and hence promotes de-
mand for credit suggests that the boom in credit market before 2008 and the increas-
ing levels of inequality might not have been a coincidence.
An interesting side note is that the concentration of capital in the top agents
goes hand in hand with a ﬂow of cash to the top. Indeed, in our model an injection
of extra capital in the lower part of the wealth pyramid the so-called helicopter
money policy is necessarily followed by a ﬂow of this extra cash to the top, via many
intermediate agents, thus generating many transactions on the way. This trickle up
dynamics should be contrasted with the usual idea of the trickle down policy, which
advocates injections of money to the top in order to boost investment. In this respect,
it is tempting to relate our ﬁndings to the recent debate on Quantitative Easing
measures, and in particular to the proposal that the (European) central bank should
ﬁnance households (or small businesses) rather than ﬁnancial institutions in order to
stimulate the economy and raise inﬂation [63, 64]. Clearly, our results support the
helicopter money policy, because injecting cash at the top does not disengages the
economy from a liquidity stall.
Extending our minimal model to take into account the endogenous dynamics of
the wealth distribution and of prices, accounting for investment and credit, is an
interesting avenue of future research, for which the present work sets the stage. In
particular, this could shed light on understanding the conditions under which the
positive feedback between returns on investment and inequality, that lies at the very
core of the dynamics which has produced ever increasing levels of inequality according
to [23, 25, 26], sets in.
In fact, a tentative extension of the present model in which wealth is not ﬁxed, but
it changes much more slowly with respect to the relaxation of the exchange dynamics
can be formulated shortly. In this case in which the two dynamics are decoupled, if the
return of investment is assumed to be proportional to the amount of liquid capital at
disposal of each agent, the model presented in this chapter can give a purely entropic
mechanism for the observed growth in inequality, since wealthier agents are also the
only ones who can aﬀord to invest a consistent fraction of their capital.
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This model can be thought of the starting point for addressing more complex
issues, such as the eﬀect of investment and the interplay between ﬁnance and the real
economy. In fact, while data on individual wealth (see [25]) usually have an exponent
of the power law that is larger than one, in ﬁrms sizes data, which are considered
in Chapter 2, this exponent is steadily less than one, especially when only ﬁnancial
ﬁrms are considered. Finance has been described as an formidable tool to increase the
market eﬃciency, through its ability to perform an optimal inter-temporal resource
allocation. In the context of this model, the decoupling discussed in the previous
chapter - the ﬁnancial deepening, might be related to the excessive broadness of the
ﬁnancial ﬁrms distribution, resulting in the freezing of the ﬁnancial market ability to
perform this resource allocation task in real economy investments.
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3.A About the rules providing detailed balance
The detailed balance condition is a useful criterium to ﬁnd the stationary state in
stochastic processes. Given a dynamics formulated in terms of the transition rates
W (Ai,Aj) between conﬁgurations Ai and Aj, If one can ﬁnd a measure P (Ai) ≥ 0
over conﬁgurations that satisﬁes the detailed balance condition
∀i, j, W (Ai,Aj)P (Ai) = W (Aj,Ai)P (Aj), (3.16)
and if the system is ergodic3, then P (Ai) is the unique stationary distribution. The
detailed balance condition is thus a local balance of the probability ﬂux between any
pair of conﬁgurations.
The simplest way to impose detailed balance is to use symmetrical transfer rates:
W (Ai,Aj) = W (Aj,Ai). In that case, one automatically gets a uniform distribution
over the space of conﬁgurations: P (A) = const,∀A. The ﬂux W (A1,A2)P (A1)
is then also uniform. It is clear that the dynamics deﬁned here has this property,
because for any two conﬁgurations that diﬀers by the ownership of one object, the
rate of the process linking them is equal to 1/(NM) in both directions.
What about the rules providing detailed balance, but without symmetry of the
rates? In that case, one would need to explicitly ﬁnd the probability density over
the conﬁgurations. Since the resulting density would be non-uniform, it would be
more diﬃcult to link dynamical observables (rate of money transfer, etc.) to static
variables (number of neighbouring conﬁguration to a given conﬁguration). We do not
explore these cases.
What are the rules that give symmetrical transfer rates? Here, we consider the
simplest case where objects are picked independently of their price4. This still leaves
us several choices. There are N − 1 rules which yield symmetric rates (and thus
respect detailed balance). The generic case is the following, with 2 ≤ n ≤ N :
 rule #n: The integer n is ﬁxed. Select n distinct agents at random. Select one
object among the set of all the objects they (collectively) own. This object will
be sold (if possible) by the owner to a randomly selected agent among the n−1
remaining agents in the set of selected agents.
3Meaning that for each pair of conﬁgurations Ai and Aj there is a path of a ﬁnite number of
intermediate conﬁgurations Aik with non-zero rate W (Aik ,Aik+1),
4One could pick an object with a rate proportional to its value. This kind of choice would still
give the same phase space and thus the same probability distribution over microstates, but the
dynamics could become very diﬀerent in terms of the speed of transactions, in particular it could
ﬂuctuate much more.
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This generic rule is a bit cryptic, but has two particular cases that are clearer:
 rule #2: Select two distinct agents at random. Select one object among the set
of all the objects they (collectively) own. This object is sold (if possible) by the
owner to the other agent.
 rule #N : Pick an object at random. The owner is then the seller. Select a
buyer at random among the N − 1 remaining agents.
Note that the rule #n = 1 does not make sense, so that there are indeed N − 1
diﬀerent rules. Here, we always use the rule #N , i.e. simply pick the object at
random. As all these rules produce an ergodic dynamics, and since the probability
distribution of conﬁgurations is the same for all rules (it is P (A) = const), it does
not matter which of these dynamical rules we picked.
3.B The full and the mean ﬁeld master equations
The proposed dynamics (rule #N in the previous appendix) is very simple: we pick
an object at random, pick an agent at random and assign the object to the agent
if possible. Let us write down the master equation for this dynamics in the most
general way, for a system with N agents, each with capital ci, for i = 1, . . . , N and
M objects.
The full master equation
We recall that an allocation of goods among the agents is described by an N ×M
allocation matrix A with entries ai,m = 1, if agent i owns good m and zero otherwise.
A change in this allocation could be described in terms of some operator eˆi,m, such
that eˆi,m = 0 always, except for agent i and good m, in which eˆi,m = 1. Then we
have the following transition rates
Rmi→j = W [A → A− eˆi,m + eˆj,m], (3.17)
describing the transition of the goodm from agent i to agent j. In the case considered
in the main text, where the goods are divided into K classes of diﬀerent prices pi(k),
this transition rates for a good in the class k, can be written explicitly in terms of
the N ×K matrix Z with entries zi,k, specifying the number of goods of class k that
agent i own
Rki→j = W [Z → Z − eˆi,k + eˆj,k] =
Mk
M
zi,k
Mk
1
N
θ
[
cj −
∑
k′
(zj,k′ + eˆj,k)pi(k′)
]
. (3.18)
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The ﬁrst fraction speciﬁes the probability that a good in the class k is picked up, the
second the probability that this good belongs to agent i and the third the probability
that the agent that is picked up as a buyer is agent j. Finally, the constrained imposed
by the θ function guarantees that the budget constraint of agent j is not violated. If
we denote P (Z, t) the probability that the system is found in the state Z = zi,k at
time t, its continuous time master equation is
∂P (Z, t)
∂t
=
∑
Z′
{W [Z ′ → Z]P (Z ′, t)−W [Z → Z ′]P (Z, t)}. (3.19)
where the sum is performed over all the allocation matrix Z ′ which are 1 exchange
away from Z.
The mean ﬁeld master equation
The most general master equation (3.19) is of little practical use. In the mean
ﬁeld approximation we write P (Z, t) = ∏Ni=1 P (zi,k, t) inside equation (3.19), and
we marginalize over the state of the system of all agents except agent i; we refer to
this state using the notation Z \ i. This allows us to write K general mean ﬁeld
master equation for a single agent i, each of one reads
∂P (zi,k, t)
∂t
=
∑
z′i,k
{w[z′i,k → zi,k]P (z′i,k, t)− w[zi,k → z′i,k]P (zi,k, t)}, (3.20)
where we have deﬁned
w[z′i,k → zi,k] =
∑
Z\i
∑
Z′\i
W [Z ′ → Z]P (Z ′ \ i, t) (3.21)
w[zi,k → z′i,k] =
∑
Z\i
∑
Z′\i
W [Z → Z ′]P (Z \ i, t) (3.22)
This can be done explicitly, for simplicity, in the case in which all agents have the same
capital (ci = c) and all goods have the same price (pi(k) = pi). In this case, the notation
can be further simpliﬁed substituting the matrix Z with a vector ~z = (z1 . . . , zN)
specifying the number of goods owned by each agents. The rates of the master
equation can be calculated, for instance the transition rate leading to zi number of
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goods for the agent i, when the agent is a buyer, is given by
w[zi − 1→ zi] =
∑
~z\i
∑
~z ′\i
W [~z ′ → ~z ]P (~z ′ \ i, t)
=
∑
~z\i
∑
j
W [~z − ei + ej → ~z ]P (~z \ i+ ej, t)
=
∑
~z\i
∑
j
zj
M
1
N
θ [c− zipi]P (~z \ i+ ej, t)
' M − (zi − 1)
M
1
N
θ [c− zipi]
In the ﬁrst passage we used the fact that all the non-zero rates leading to zi in which
agent i is a buyer, involve a single exchange, from an agent j. In the last passage
we performed the sum over ~z \ i and we put ∑~z\i P (~z \ i + ej, t) = 1, ignoring the
fact that there is a dependence on the conﬁguration of the system in the transition
rates. This dependence can be expected to be negligible when the number of agents
and the number of goods are both very large, because it depends only on the value
of zi. More precisely, the assumption that is done is that P (~z \ i) = P (~z \ i|zi).
Analogous calculations can be done for the case in which agent i is a seller, i.e.
w[zi + 1→ zi] =
∑
~z\i
∑
~z ′\i
W [~z ′ → ~z ]P (~z ′ \ i, t)
=
∑
~z\i
∑
j
W [~z + ei − ej → ~z ]P (~z \ i− ej, t)
=
∑
~z\i
∑
j
zi + 1
M
1
N
θ [c− (zj + 1)pi]P (~z \ i− ej, t)
' zi + 1
M
p(suc),
where in the last passage p(suc) = 〈θ [c− (zj + 1)pi]〉 is introduced as the average
number of buyer who can aﬀord the transaction.
Finally, calculating all 4 possible terms giving non vanishing contributions in
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(3.20), we get
∂tP (zi, t) =P (zi − 1, t) 1
N
(1− δ(zi − 1,m))
+P (zi + 1, t)
zi
M
(
p(suc)
)
−P (zi, t) 1
N
(1− δ(zi,m))
−P (zi, t) zi
M
(
p(suc)
)
, (3.23)
where the θ constraints have been turned into δ constraints, by introducing m as the
integer part of c/pi.
The detailed balance condition implies that, when looking for the stationary so-
lution of this equation ∂tP (zi, t) = 0, the terms have to cancel in pairs, leading to
equation (3.4) in the main text.
3.C Computation of p
(suc)
k in the large λ limit
Derivation of p(suc) and c(1) in the large λ limit for 1 type of good.
As discussed in the main text, we can compute p(suc) using
p(suc) = 1− 1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi(z = mi) (3.24)
approximating the probability to be on a threshold Pi(z = mi) by
Pi(z = mi) =
{(
1− mi
λ
)
for mi  λ
0 for mi > λ
. (3.25)
The ﬁrst case can be understood by noting that
Pi(z = mi) =
λmi 1
mi!∑mi
x=0 λ
x 1
x!
=
1
1 + mi
λ
+ mi(mi−1)
λ2
+ . . .
'
(
1− mi
λ
)
, (3.26)
where the approximation is valid in the limit mi  λ. Assuming this approximation
to be valid in all the range mi < λ is clearly a bad assumption for all agents with mi
close to λ. However the wealth is power law distributed, and so the weight of agents
with mi ∼ λ is negligible in the sum over all agents, equation (3.24). The accuracy
of this approximation increases when the exponent of the power law β decreases.
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Then p(suc) can be computed using
p(suc) = 1− 1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi(z = mi) ' 1−
∫ c(1)=λpi
1
dc βc−β−1
(
1− c
λpi
)
. (3.27)
This is an implicit expression for p(suc), since it appears on the l.h.s. of the equation
and also on the r.h.s. (because λ = M
Np(suc)
).
When β > 1 this expression can be expressed to be realization-independent, using
p(suc) =
M
Nλ
=
Π
C
E [c]
c(1)
, (3.28)
where E [c] = β/(β − 1) is the expected value of the wealth per agent. We also use
the fact that we ﬁll in the system a number M of goods in such a way to have a ﬁxed
ratio Π/C. Performing the integral on the r.h.s of equation (3.27) gives an equation
for c(1):
Π
C
E [c]
c(1)
= c(1)
−β
(
1
1− β
)
− β
1− β
1
c(1)
, (3.29)
that simpliﬁes into:
c(1) =
[
β
(
1− Π
C
)]1/(1−β)
. (3.30)
Derivation of p
(suc)
k and c
(k) in the large λ limit for several types of good.
An analytic derivation for the p
(suc)
k and c
(k) can be obtained also for the cases of
several goods, but only in the limit in which prices are well separated (i.e. pi(k+1) 
pi(k)) and the total values of good of any class is approximately constant (we use
Mkpi(k) = Π/K = const). In this limit we expect to ﬁnd a sharp separation of the
population of agents into classes. This is because M1  M2  . . .  MK implies
that the market is ﬂooded with objects of the class 1, which constantly change hands
and essentially follow the laws found in the single type of object case. On top of this
dense gas of objects of class 1, we can consider objects of class 2 as a perturbation
(they are picked M2/M1 times less often!). On the time scale of the dynamics of
objects of type 2, the distribution of cash is such that all agents with a wealth less
than c(1) = pi(1)λ1 have their budget saturated by objects of type 1 and typically do
not have enough cash to buy objects of type 2 nor more expensive ones. Likewise,
there is a class of agents with c(1) < ci ≤ c(2) that will manage to aﬀord goods of
types 1 and 2, but will hardly ever hold goods more expensive that pi(2).
In brief, the economy is segmented into K classes, with class k composed of all
agents with ci ∈ [c(k), c(k+1)) who can aﬀord objects of class up to k, but who are
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excluded from markets for more expensive goods, because they rarely have enough
cash to buy goods more expensive than pi(k). This structure into classes can be read
oﬀ from ﬁgure 3.3, where we present the average cash of agents, given their cash
in a speciﬁc case (see caption). The horizontal lines denote the prices pi(k) of the
diﬀerent objects, and the intersections with the horizontal lines deﬁne the thresholds
c(k). Agents that have ci just above c
(k) are cash-ﬁlled in terms of object of class k,
but are cash-starved in terms of objects pi(k′), k
′ > k.
The liquidities p(suc) can be given by the following expression
p
(suc)
k = 1−
1
N
N∑
i=1
P
{
zi,k = mi,k(z
(k)
i )
}
= 1− 1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi(not accepting good type k)
(3.31)
According to the previous discussion of segmentation of the system into K classes,
and using the same approximation for this threshold probability discussed in the case
of 1 type of good, we assume
Pi(not accepting good type k) =

1 for mi < λk−1(
1− mi
λk
)
for λk−1 < mi < λk
0 for mi > λk
, (3.32)
Then
p
(suc)
k ' 1−
∫ c(k−1)
1
dc βc−β−1 −
∫ c(k)
c(k−1)
dc βc−β−1
(
1− c
c(k)
)
(3.33)
In this case now we have
p
(suc)
k =
Mk
Nλk
=
Π
KC
E [c]
c(k)
(3.34)
With similar calculations to the ones showed for the previous case, one can easily get
to the recurrence relation:
c(k) =
[
β
(
c(k−1)
)1−β − β Π
KC
] 1
1−β
. (3.35)
Iterating, we explicit this into:
c(k) =
[
βk −
(
β − βk+1
1− β
)
Π
KC
] 1
1−β
, (3.36)
A comparison between the analytical estimate and numerical simulations, pre-
sented in ﬁgure 3.5, shows that this approximation provides an accurate description
of the collective behaviour of the model.
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Figure 3.5: Success probability of transaction p
(suc)
k as a function of the Pareto exponent β.
Comparison between numerical simulations and analytical estimates for one class of goods
(left panel) and two classes of goods (right panel). The blue solid circles are the result of
Monte Carlo simulations performed for N = 105 agents and averaged over 5 realizations.
Here the error bars indicate the min and max value of p
(suc)
k over all realizations (we used
the adjusted Pareto law for the right panel, see appendix 3.E). The red lines are the
analytic estimates according to equation (3.10) and equation (3.14) for left and right panels,
respectively. The green crossed lines correspond to numerically (see appendix 3.E) solving
the analytical solution (3.12) for a population composed of N = 64 (kind of) agents.
See also in ﬁgure 3.6 how the liquidity over-concentrates (with respect to capital
concentration). There, we compare the liquid and capital concentrations, measured
via their Gini coeﬃcients, for various values of β in the system of ﬁgure 3.3 (K =
10, g = 1.5, pi(1) = 0.001, C/Π = 1.2). In particular, note that the limit β → 1+ is
singular, as G` reaches one around β = 1.1, with smaller β yielding also G` ≈ 1.
This is an alternative way to see how the concentration of capital generates an over-
concentration of liquidities.
3.D An argument for p(suc) → 0 for β < 1, in the N →∞ limit
In this appendix we give an diﬀerent and intuitive argument to justify why we expect
the p(suc) to go to zero, when β < 1, for a very large system, with number of agents
N → ∞. We are going to formulate the argument for one type of good, but it can
be generalised to the generic case.
Let's rank the N agents from the richest c1 to the poorest cN . The argument can
be divided into two main steps. First we will show that when β < 1 there is always
a ﬁnite n such that the capital of the ﬁrst n agents, the n richest in the ranking, is
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Figure 3.6: Gini coeﬃcient G` of the cash distribution (liquid capital) in the stationary
state of the model as a function of the Gini Gc of the wealth distribution. The dashed line
indicates proportionality between cash and wealth, in which case the inequality in both is
exactly the same. The wealth follows a Pareto distribution with exponent β that tunes the
degree of inequality (the higher is β, the more egalitarian the distribution).
around the same size as total capital of the remaining agents
crich ≡
n∑
i=1
ci ' cpoor ≡
N∑
i=n+1
ci (3.37)
and this n stays ﬁnite in the N → ∞ limit. More generally we can ﬁnd a threshold
n for which the capital of the richest n agents is equal to any given ﬁnite fraction of
the total capital of the system.
Secondly we will show that in a typical allocation of goods, the agents belonging
to the poorest class of agents is typically with no cash and thus they mostly do not
accept a transition when they are selected as buyers. Since the probability of selecting
a buyer is uniform and since n
N
∼ 0 in the large N limit, we will then prove that p(suc)
has to be null.
According to rank ordering statistics (see [34]), the typical value of the capital of
the i−th agent in the ranking is
ctypi = c1
1
i1/β
(3.38)
The typical value for the total capital of ﬁrst (second respectively) class of agents is
ctyprich = c1
n∑
i=1
1
i1/β
ctyppoor = c1
N∑
i=n+1
1
i1/β
(3.39)
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When β ≥ 1, the inﬁnite series ∑i 1i1/β is divergent, then in the N → ∞ limit we
have ∑n
i=1
1
i1/β∑∞
i=n+1
1
i1/β
= 0 (3.40)
for any ﬁnite n.
When instead β < 1 the inﬁnite series is convergent, then there is a ﬁnite n for which∑n
i=1
1
i1/β∑∞
i=n+1
1
i1/β
∼ 1, (3.41)
thus for which ctyprich ' ctyppoor. More generally, an n can be found in such a way that
the ratio of rich-poor capital is equal to any ﬁnite value.
In particular, we can also ﬁnd a ﬁnite n for which the partition of the agents in
rich and poor is such that, even if we initially distribute the goods among the agents
in such a way that the all the poorer are ﬁlled with goods, and the only agents with
some cash are the ﬁrst n in the ranking, the goods are equally divided among the
rich and the poor classes, i.e.
Mrich 'Mpoor. (3.42)
We show now that this conﬁguration is quite close to a typical stationary allocation
of goods, under our dynamical process. We can describe the dynamics in this system
using a birth-death process using as a variable the number of holes in the poor class,
i.e. the number of agents in the poor class that are not on their capital threshold.
The transition rates for this variable i can be approximately written as
p(i→ i+ 1) ' n
N
(3.43)
p(i→ i− 1) ' i
N
. (3.44)
In fact, the number of poor agents with some cash increases by one if a rich is selected
as a buyer (event with probability n/N), and with probability almost 1 the buyer is
going to be a poor agent on the capital threshold (if N >> n). This number decreases
by one if a poor agent who is able to buy is selected as a buyer. When the goods are
equally divided among rich and poor, the selection of the seller gives with the same
probability an agent in the poor or in the rich class.
If the dynamics preserves these rates. it is easy to see that under a such birth-
death process the typical number of holes in the poor phase are of the same order as
n, hence typically agents in the poor class are not able to buy a good, and we can
conclude that p(suc) is order n/N in this limit.
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3.E Details on the numerical methods
Monte-Carlo simulations
We perform our Monte Carlo simulations of the trading market for N = 105 agents.
Prices generally start from pi(1) and increase by a factor g between each good class.
The minimal wealth is cmin = 1. The ratio C/Π is ﬁxed as indicated in captions, and
most importantly is kept constant between diﬀerent realizations. As the total wealth
ﬂuctuates, so does the total number of goods.
There are no peculiar diﬃculties with the numerical method (apart from the large
ﬂuctuations in the average wealth, addressed below). The only thing one has to be
careful with is to ensure that the stationary state has been reached, i.e. that all
observables have a stationary value, an indication that the (peculiar) initial condi-
tion has been completely forgotten. The codes for this Monte Carlo simulation are
available online [65].
Adjusted Pareto wealth distribution
For K ≥ 2 we have predictions for the β ∼ 1 regime, in which the average wealth
is particularly ﬂuctuating from realization to realization. Because the value of E [c]
controls the number M of objects introduced in the market, this in turns produces
large ﬂuctuations in the values of the p
(suc)
k which can make it diﬃcult to have robust
results.
More importantly, the typical value of the (empirical) average wealth 〈c〉 is usually
quite diﬀerent from its expectation value E [c]. This eﬀect is well known and well
documented for power laws, but we present a concrete example of it in ﬁgure 3.7 to
emphasize its intensity.
For the sample size that is typically manageable in our simulations, i.e. N = 105,
the typical value for the average value of the wealth (using e.g. β = 1.1) is of the
order of the half of its expected value: 〈c〉 ≈ 7 ≈ E [c] /2. This indicates that N = 105
is (by far) an insuﬃcient size to correctly sample a power-law with exponent β = 1.1.
To circumvent this problem, we introduce the adjusted Pareto distribution. The
idea is to draw numbers from a power law distribution as usual, and then to adjust
the value of a few of them so that the empirical average matches the expected one.
The algorithm is the following: Start from a true random Pareto distribution.
 if 〈c〉 < E [c], we select an agent at random and increase its wealth until we
have exactly 〈c〉 = E [c].
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of the average 〈c〉j of power laws depending on their sam-
ple size N (from top to bottom, N = 106, 105, 104, 103, 102) for 1000 realizations each
(j = 1, ..., 1000), using an exponent β = 1.1. The dashed line indicates the expectation
value E [c] = cminβ/(β − 1). We see that even for huge samples, the typical 〈c〉j 's are
signiﬁcantly smaller than the expected E [c].
 if 〈c〉 > E [c], we select the wealthiest agent and decrease its wealth until we
have exactly 〈c〉 = E [c], or until its wealth becomes cmin. If we reach the
latter case (it is quite unlikely), then we perform the same operation on the
second-wealthiest agent, and so on until 〈c〉 = E [c].
As can be seen in ﬁgure 3.7, the most common case is the ﬁrst one. The corresponding
adjustment is equivalent to re-drawing the wealth of a single agent until it is such
that 〈c〉 = E [c]. This is a weak deviation from a true Pareto distribution. The second
case is more rare, and mostly consists also in a correction on the wealth of a single
agent.
This change in the wealth distribution is very eﬃcient at reducing the variability
between diﬀerent realizations of the same β value. Furthermore it ensures that we can
compare our numerical results at ﬁnite N with the predictions that implicitly assume
N =∞, since we now have 〈c〉 = E [c]. It is quite crucial to use this adjusted Pareto
law for the small β's (i.e. for β ≤ 1.3). See ﬁgure 3.8 to have an idea of what this
modiﬁed distribution means: the only changes in the two sample shown would be in
the values of the wealthiest agent.
Algorithm computing self-consistent solution p(suc), Z(ci)
Here we describe the algorithm used to converge to a self-consistent set of values
for {p(suc)1 , p(suc)2 , Z(c1), ..., Z(cN)}, i.e. solving equation (3.13) for K = 2 (or more
simply equation (3.6) in the case of a single type of goods). It can be generalized
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Figure 3.8: Diﬀerent instances and representation of power-law distributed wealth (or
Pareto distribution). Blue and pale blue circles are two realisations for N = 104 agents,
green crosses are an example of staircase-like distribution (a useful approximation of a Pareto
law that we use elsewhere) and the black dashed line is the law itself (blue dots converge to
it in the N →∞ limit). Left: Probability distribution, with shifts up and down for clarity
(i.e. it is not normalized) Right: wealth ci of each agent, sorted by the rank i. Note that the
wealth of the wealthiest agents (low rank) ﬂuctuates a lot from realization to realization.
straightforwardly toK > 2, although it may become numerically extremely expensive
(see also our code, [65]). The results (green crosses) presented in ﬁgure 3.5 were
obtained using the method described here.
For each agent there is a constant Z(ci) to be determined self-consistently. This
presents a technical diﬃculty, as for a true power-law distribution, each agent gets a
diﬀerent wealth and thus the number of constants to compute is N .
A way to tackle this diﬃculty is to consider a staircase-like distribution of wealth,
where agents are distributed in groups with homogeneous wealth cg and where the
number of agents per group is Ng ∼
∫ cg+1
cg
ρ(c)c., so that individual agents approxi-
mately follow a power law with exponent β. See ﬁgure 3.8 (green crosses) to have
an idea of what this modiﬁed distribution means concretely. This kind of staircase
distribution is not a true power-law, in particular because its maximum is always
deterministic and ﬁnite. However, as we now have 1 < N  N , we can numerically
solve the N + 1 equations and thus ﬁnd the exact value of p(suc). Of course, the value
of p(suc) found in this way perfectly matches with Monte Carlo results if and only if
we use the exact same distribution of wealth and goods in the simulation. This is
not surprising at all, and merely validates our iterative scheme.
However, we note that staircase-like wealth distributions turn out to be very good
approximations of true power laws, when the wealth levels cg are suﬃciently reﬁned
and the number of classes N suﬃciently large. In particular, using cg = bg with a
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Figure 3.9: (a): Average wealth 〈c〉 dependence on N for a staircase distribution, using
β = 2 and b = 1.1. Black dots: average computed (exactly) for the staircase distribution.
Dashed black: expectation value for the corresponding true power law. Convergence is
reached as soon as N ≈ 50.
(b): Dependence on N of the p(suc)1 computed from the iterative method, using a staircase-
like distribution of wealth (green crosses). As soon as N > 50, it approaches its true value,
i.e. the value obtained for a true power-law with exponent β = 2 (dashed blue line). We
used b = 1.1.
(c): Average wealth 〈c〉 dependence on N for a staircase distribution, using β = 1.1 and
b = 1.1. Black dots: average computed (exactly) for the staircase distribution. Dashed
black: expectation value for the corresponding true power law. It takes very large N to
converge.
base b ≈ 1+, it can be seen that for large enough N , the average wealth 〈c〉 converges
to a value very close to the expected one E [c] (and no longer depends on N ). For
large β, typically β ≥ 1.5, convergence is reached rather fast (N ≥ 50 is enough),
and the iterative method can be used (see for instance ﬁgure 3.9a). Under these
conditions, the observables (e.g. p(suc)) have the same values for a true power law
and the corresponding staircase-distribution (see ﬁgure 3.9b). However for smaller
values of β, convergence is very slow and one needs at least N > 200 to converge
(see ﬁgure 3.9c). The maximum wealth is then very large, which makes the iterative
method useless for practical purposes (overﬂow errors arise, and the number of terms
in the sums to be computed explodes exponentially, along with the computational
cost). More details on the algorithm we actually use can be found in reference [65].
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Chapter 4
Lost in Diversiﬁcation
There is a growing consensus around the idea that increasingly complex ﬁnancial
products play an important role in the emergence of new instabilities and systemic
risks [66] [67] [27]. Historically, ﬁnancial innovations have been seen as a formidable
tool to increase the eﬃciency of the market, reducing the risk associated with any
investment strategy and ensuring an increasingly optimal resource allocation between
investors and the real economy.
After the 2007-2008 global ﬁnancial crisis, this picture has been showing signs
of fraying. The most commonly believed determinant of the crisis is rooted in the
ﬁnancial bubble of the mortgage subprime structured ﬁnance market [28]. As it has
been discussed widely in the economic literature [68] [69], the formidable complexity
of these type of products brought down a curtain of opacity that was able to hide the
true risk of the underlying assets (the subprime mortages). In section 4.1 we give a
brief account of this history.
While the nature of these instruments as ﬁnancial weapons of mass destruction
[70] has been widely recognised, most of the response to the crisis did not address
the core issue of the transparency loss implicit in ﬁnancial transformations. For this
reason, from section 4.2 onwards, we introduce a stylized model where both future
returns of a pool of assets and some side information related to these assets are treated
as random variables. The goal is to try to sort out how relevant the information is
for the pricing of a ﬁnancial product built from the aforementioned pool, and how
this information should be transmitted in the most informative way.
In section 4.3, we deﬁne the key concepts of ﬁnancial transformations, relevance
of information as well as its price alongside with some general results. Finally, in
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sections 4.4 and 4.5 we explicitly construct an instance of such class of models for
binary variable, derived from the maximum entropy principle.
4.1 The rise and fall of the structured ﬁnance market
Classical theories of ﬁnancial markets are based on a set of very strong assumptions,
which often lead to a systematic underestimation of both the non-systemic and the
systemic risk. One of those assumption is the eﬃcient market hypothesis [71] [72],
which roughly states that the ﬁnancial markets are able to process all the information
coming from the real economy and from the news, and consequently the price of any
stock exchanged in the market reﬂects faithfully this information.
The crisis, and in particular the role played as a trigger by the mortgage backed
securities market, exposed a huge ineﬃciency in the ﬁnancial market; many of these
ﬁnancial products were commonly perceived by investors as virtually risk-free and
certiﬁed as such by rating agencies, even though all the information about the status
of the underlying assets was available to market participants.
These ﬁnancial instruments are usually called Asset Backed Securities (ABS) and
when the individual assets which compose the pool are credits over some residential
mortgages, they are called Residential Mortgages Backed Securities (RMBS). Al-
though they are fairly complex themselves, they can be used as individual blocks to
build even more complex products, like the Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO).
See ﬁgure 4.1 and its caption for a brief explanation of how these instruments work.
The rise and fall of the structured ﬁnance market has been dramatic [28]. In
less than a decade, before the crisis, the issuance of these products within the U.S.
economy have been growing by a factor larger than 10. About $100 billion in ABSs
were issued in the last quarter of 2006 and in the ﬁrst two quarters of 2007. However,
at the beginning of 2008, these quantities dropped to less than $5 billion per quarter.
At the same time, a vertical drop in the ratings of these products was observed, 90%
of the ABS tranches underwritten by Merrill Lynch in 2007, initially rated AAA,
were downgraded to junk (rated below investment grade) in just few weeks [28].
For a variety of reasons, market participants and rating agencies did not accurately
measure the risk inherent with ﬁnancial innovations such as ABSs and CDOs. One
of such reasons, in the case of the RMBS market, was the fact that, despite these
instruments were accompanied by a large documentation containing full details about
the underlying assets, the status of the housing market and the infamous risk proﬁles
of the mortgages typically involved, were eﬀectively hidden to almost all investors
[69] .
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worked as long as mortgages all over the country and of all different characteristics didn't default all at once.  When homeowners all over the country defaulted, there was not enough money to pay off all the mortgage-related securities.
Higher-rated bonds are the �irst paid each month, so they are safer. But lower-rated bonds have the potential to earn more.
RMBS payment 
structure
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) were created by taking the lower-rated tranches out of the MBSs and repackaging them. Most of this CDO is highly rated, even though it is built out of high-risk assets.Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness, April 2008.
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE PAYMENTS
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE PAYMENTS
THE THEORY OF HOW THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM CREATED AAA-RATED ASSETS OUT OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES
In the �inancial system, AAA-rated assets are the most valuable because they are the safest for investors and the easiest to sell. Financial institutions packaged and re-packaged securities built on high-risk subprime mortgages to create AAA-rated assets. The system 
People all over the country take out mortgages. Financial institutions group hundreds of subprime mortgages into Mortgage Backed Securities (MBSs).
The mortgage payments are collected by a 
�inancial institution and payments distributed to bond holders. Higher rated tranches are 
paid �irst. When monthly mortgage payments are not made, payments may not reach holders of lower-rated tranches.
The securities are grouped into tranches by levels of risk and earnings potential for bond holders. When everybody can pay their mortgage in full each month, each group of bond holders gets paid.
1
2
3
Another �inancial institution does the same thing with high-risk tranches of CDOs, creating a CDO-squared.
Figure 4.1: Taken from reference [73]. The cash ﬂow coming from individual payments
over some credits (residential mortgages in this case) is pictured as a water ﬂow. When
these credits are pooled together, the cash ﬂow coming from these payments is collected,
and distributed to investors according to a prioritized structure of claims. In practice, an
investor who possess a given tranche of a RMBS gets a payoﬀ if more than a given threshold
of the payments which constitute the pool are regularly paid. The value of this threshold
deﬁnes the seniority of the RMBS tranche; while a AAA tranche pays back even when few
payments are executed, for a BB- tranche to give a positive payoﬀ, many more (almost all)
individual payments have to. The most junior tranches (more risky, rated BB- or unrated in
this ﬁgure), have been used as the building blocks of diﬀerent products, CDOs, which work
with the same mechanism as the initial RMBSs, just with diﬀerent underlying assets. This
process can be further iterated, junior tranches of CDOs can be used as building blocks of
a CDO2.
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After the crisis, the framework and the very existence of these structured ﬁnance
products has been subject to criticism, and new models for risk assessment have been
proposed, mainly focused on the issue of how to take into account the dependencies
among assets, when computing future expectations of a set of assets. Nevertheless,
the prevailing view is still that securitisation techniques are able to create low risk
ﬁnancial products that are somehow information insensitive or money-like. The
subtleness associated with this belief is that these products will consequently be
exchanged between investors without the due diligence, in particular without an
adequate analysis of the building blocks these products are composed with.
In order to oppose this tendency, the ﬁnancial industry is pursuing an eﬀort [29]
to build an eﬃcient and standardized system, or a common language, through which
this information should be easily available to all market participants. Such a ﬁnan-
cial barcode, which should be attached to any ﬁnancial product, should contain all
the information that is relevant in order to make realistic estimates about return
and risk of the product, from the risk proﬁles of the building blocks to the market
fundamentals. Yet, it is not clear how such barcodes should be constructed, which
information they should contain and whether they should be statically or dynamically
updated, when new information is available. In particular, an interesting open ques-
tion is whether demand for such barcodes may naturally arise and how it should be
priced, since without a barcode price the seller does not have an incentive for sharing
the information.
4.2 The model: how side information aﬀects future returns
Let's suppose we have a pool of stocks {Xi} = {X1, . . . , Xn}, where each Xi is the
return on an investment, e.g. a loan, a mortgage, an option or a generic ﬁnancial
asset. Together with these stocks, some additional variables {Yi} ={Y1, . . . Yn} are
available, where each Yi represents side information related to the stock Xi (e.g. the
income of the borrower of the loan or information on the fundamentals of the stock).
We assume that both the values of {Xi} and the values of {Yi} are unknown to the
investor, therefore they can be treated as random variables, described by a probability
distribution P ({Xi}, {Yi}).
The investor faces the decision problem of how to evaluate the uncertain future
returns of the stocks {Xi}. He/she can perform this task either using a prior belief,
encoded in the marginal distribution P ({Xi}), or retrieving the information {Yi}
and using instead the conditional distribution P ({Xi}|{Yi}). We are interested to
understand in which cases the retrieval of the information is relevant for the risk
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assessment.
Figure 4.2: The general structure of the models we are going to consider. Each Xi inter-
acts with the system only through its associated Yi, as expressed in equation (4.1). The
dependence between the returns of the assets is a consequence of the dependence among
information {Yi}.
The general structure of the models we are going to consider is deﬁned by a
joint p.d.f of returns and information. We assume the returns to be conditionally
independent given the information. Namely the joint p.d.f has the form
P ({Xi}, {Yi}) = P ({Yi})× P ({Xi} |{Yi})
= P ({Yi})×
∏
i
P (Xi |Yi) . (4.1)
The factorizability of the conditional P ({Xi} |{Yi}) implies that any dependence
among returns, if it exists, enters in the game only through the {Yi}, since each
individual Xi becomes independent on the rest of the system when its own Yi is
speciﬁed. This assumption encodes the idea that when the most relevant factors
aﬀecting future returns are taken into account and quantiﬁed in the {Yi} variables,
the additional ones act just like noise.
For simplicity, the conditional distributions P (Xi|Yi) in equation (4.1) are as-
sumed to be identical and we are going to focus on models where the variables {Yi}
are identically distributed, i.e. the distribution P ({Yi}) is invariant under permuta-
tions of the variables {Yi}.
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In the following, we specialize to the case of binary variables
{
Xi = ±1
Yi = ±1 .
(4.2)
For instance, we have in mind a situation where Xi = 1 if the investment yields a
positive return or if a loan payment is regularly paid back, while Xi = −1 in the
opposite case. We assume that the information associated with the stocks can be
quantiﬁed and then quantized in binary variables as well. For instance, Yi could be
positive when the investment had positive returns at previous times (often ﬁnancial
time series show strong persistence) or when the previous payments have been paid
in time by the borrower.
In realistic risk management practices, the probability distributions are never
known exactly. Typically only few observables, such as expected returns and some
correlations, are measured, often with low precision. These observed moments (e.g.
E[Xi], E[XiXj] or E[XiYi]) can be used to infer the joint probability distribution
of returns and information. Within the assumption of our model equation (4.1),
and with binary variables, the conditional probability P (Xi|Yi) (identical for all i) is
speciﬁed by just two numbers. The marginal distribution of the {Yi} can instead be
more complex. Because of the aforementioned ignorance about the distribution and
about its moments, we assume P ({Yi}) to be the most general compatible with the
few observed moments. Such an approach is usually referred to as maximum entropy
principle, and it has been used in a wide range of applications, as well as in the foun-
dations of Statistical Physics [74]. In the speciﬁc example of binary variables, when
only ﬁrst and second moments are known, and when the information variables are
identically distributed, the result of the entropy maximization yields a fully connected
Ising model [75]. The use of an Ising model for a joint return distribution has already
been considered in the literature [76], and it has been show to weight large losses
very diﬀerently from a standard multivariate Gaussian distribution, widely used by
practitioners.
In the cases we are going to consider in more details in sections 4.4 and 4.5, the
joint p.d.f. is speciﬁed by four parameters, two of them ﬁxing the conditional p.d.f.
P ({Xi}|{Yi}) and two describing P ({Yi}). In the next section we highlight some
general results that are not speciﬁc of any particular choice for the model and we
introduce some observables we are interested in.
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4.3 General results
Financial products and complexity
A typical practice in ﬁnance is the pooling of a large number of assets, obtaining
portfolios or more complex investment structures. In our model, such a ﬁnancial
product can be described through a function F ({Xi}), expressing the return of the
product as a function of the returns of the individual assets that compose it. In the
following, we are going to consider the homogeneous portfolio, or average return
X({Xi}) = 1
n
∑
i
Xi. (4.3)
The return of such an investment is the average return of the diﬀerent assets that
are pooled together in the portfolio. This corresponds to one of the most basic
diversiﬁcation techniques, where the investor decides that instead of investing his/her
total wealth in a single asset Xi, he/she invests a fraction 1/n in each of the n assets.
The beneﬁt of diversiﬁcation is that it reduces risk. For example, for n i.i.d. stocks,
we have that the variance V(X) = V(Xi)/n is reduced by a factor of n, with respect
to that of the individual stocks. In the next subsection we clarify why the variance
can be considered a proxy of the risk of a ﬁnancial asset.
Another class of products we consider are Asset Backed Securities (ABS), the
typical products of the structured ﬁnance market, whose return function is based
over a prioritized structure of claims. In these products, the claims over the cash ﬂow
of the underlying asset returns {Xi} are prioritized, structured in such a way that
the ABS tranche yields a positive return when the total return is larger then a given
threshold. The return of these products is
Fk({Xi}) = sgn
(∑
i
Xi − k
)
, (4.4)
where sgn(x) = 1 when x ≥ 0 and sgn(x) = −1 when x < 0. Diﬀerent tranches
correspond to diﬀerent risk proﬁles that can be obtained with diﬀerent values of k.
The transformation of {Xi} into Fk({Xi}) is an example of a securitisation and the
advantage of it is that it turns a set of risky assets into assets with a controlled risk
proﬁle. For example, it is possible to obtain assets that are very safe, i.e. for which
Fk({Xi}) = 1 with high probability, by taking a suﬃciently small value of k.
Given the complexity of these products and the large number of assets that are
typically used to construct these ﬁnancial products, the issue of quantifying the risk
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associated with these investments is a subtle problem [28]. In the following subsection
we discuss the lack of transparency that is involved in the processes of diversiﬁcation
and securitization.
Quantifying transparency loss
In order to capture how relevant is the information content of the {Yi} about the
{Xi} variables and about a generic transformation (i.e. product) F ({Xi}), themutual
information provides a natural way to address this issue in quantitative terms. For
a pair of random variables A and B, it is given by
I(A;B) =
∑
a,b
P (a, b) log
(
P (a, b)
P (a)P (b)
)
= H(A)−H(A|B), (4.5)
where the sum is intended over all possible outcomes a and b of the random variables.
It can be shown to be equivalent to the reduction in entropyH(A) = −∑a P (a) logP (a)
of the random variable A, when the value of the random variable B is given, averaged
over the possible outcomes of B, H(A|B) = ∑b P (b)H(A|B = b).
A general result involving the mutual information is the so called data processing
inequality, which we can formulate in our setting in the following way. When the
{Xi} are manipulated and transformed in a product through some F ({Xi}), some
information may or may not be lost, but for sure no information can be gained. This
can be formalized using the mutual information as follows
I(F ({Xi}); {Yi}) ≤ I({Xi}; {Yi}). (4.6)
In the following, we consider the mutual information as a measure of how much
the information contained in the {Yi} variables is informative on the return of the
ﬁnancial product F ({Xi}).
Another quantity we are going to consider is the mutual information per bit, i.e.
the ratio between the mutual information and the entropy,
I(F ({Xi}); {Yi})
H(F ({Xi})) , (4.7)
which expresses the reduction of the initial ignorance about the return of F ({Xi})
when the information is given.
The data processing inequality also holds when a manipulation of the information
is considered, namely
I({Xi};G({Yi})) ≤ I({Xi}; {Yi}). (4.8)
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When the pools are composed by a large number of assets, it is diﬃcult for investors
to transmit all the original information about the individual assets, from the product
originators to the buyers. In practice, this may happen because the information is
costly and because sellers have no incentives to share such information and provide
details on the ﬁnal product [69]. Yet, we can imagine that some compressed version of
the information, expressed in terms of a function of the original information, G({Yi}),
might be used instead of the whole set of information variables {Yi}, with some
information loss in the process. This is a relevant issue in the ﬁnancial industry,
where the introduction of barcodes for ﬁnancial products has been discussed [29]. An
optimal barcode for a ﬁnancial product F ({Xi}) would be one for which the mutual
information
I(F ({Xi});G({Yi})) (4.9)
is maximal, with respect to all possible compressions G.
A ﬁrst general result for the case of binary assets and binary information variables
can be obtained for the type of products we introduced before, i.e the homogeneous
diversiﬁcation and the ABS. Both these type of products are function of the asset
returns {Xi} through their aggregate return X =
∑
iXi (we denote by capital X the
sum of the returns Xi in the following). The probability distribution for the aggregate
return X have the following property:
P (X |{Yi}) = P (X |Y ) , (4.10)
where Y is the aggregate information Y =
∑
i Yi. Such a property holds as a con-
sequence of the permutation symmetry of the sum. This is actually a general result
for any function of the stocks that is symmetric under any permutation of the stocks.
This implies that the sum (or the average) Y (or Y/n) is an optimal barcode for any
ﬁnancial transformation F (X) which is a function of the average return of the assets,
i.e.
I(F (X);Y ) = I(F (X); {Yi}). (4.11)
Pricing information
A task closely related to the relevance of the information {Yi} is its pricing, a typical
goal of portfolio theory and risk management practices.
It is commonly believed that complex ﬁnancial products, obtained by pooling
together a large number of stocks, have the nice property of reducing the associated
risks. For instance, this can be quantiﬁed by a reduction in the variance of the
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corresponding distribution, with respect to the variance of the single asset.
V(F ({Xi})) < V(Xi) (4.12)
To understand why variance can be a proxy of the risk of an asset we may think to
the following setup of a two times market [77] .
An investor in this market is endowed with an initial wealth W0 and an utility
function U(W) which quantiﬁes how much the wealth W satisﬁes the need of our
investor. The utility function U is usually assumed to be an increasing and concave
function of W , to ensure respectively greediness and risk aversion of the investor.
At some time t0 the investor may decide to invest part of his/her initial wealth
W0 to buy A units of cash (say $) of an asset with return Xi, resulting in owing
W0 − pAXi + AXi where pAXi is the price of the asset. The return of the asset Xi
is known only at some later time t1, so at time t0 it can be considered a random
variable. The fair price, i.e. the price that makes the investor indiﬀerent between
buying and not buying the asset is given by the condition
U(W0) = E [U(W0 − pAXi + AXi)] , (4.13)
where the expected value E [·] is intended on the probability distribution of Xi.
If we assume that AW0 and we Taylor expand expression (4.13), i.e.
U(W0) ' E
[
U(W0) + U ′(W0)(AXi − pAXi) +
1
2
U ′′(W0)(AXi − pAXi)2
]
, (4.14)
we get
pAX ' AE[Xi] + U
′′(W0)
2U ′(W0) E [(AXi − pAXi)
2]. (4.15)
In the following we are going to discuss in which cases the truncation of this this
Taylor expansion is meaningful. By now, if we assume that the second term on the
r.h.s is small compared to the ﬁrst, the price on the r.h.s. can be assumed to be
approximately equal to AE[Xi]. In this case, the equation for the price reduces to
pAX = AE[Xi] + A2
U ′′(W0)
2U ′(W0)V[Xi] = A (E[Xi]− αV[Xi]) . (4.16)
In the last equation α = −AU ′′(W0)
2U ′(W0) is dimensionless, and it is positive (since U ′ > 0
and U ′′ < 0 are the general requirement for an utility function). That is, the fair
price for A units of an asset with return Xi is given by its expected return, minus a
term embedding the uncertainty of the probability distribution, as expressed by its
variance; the minus sign precisely highlight the risk aversion.
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We further assume investors with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
functions [78] [77]. This means, for instance U(W) = Wγ, with γ < 1, or U(W) =
logW . In these cases. α is proportional to A/W0, and it can be assumed to be small
from the very beginning. Furthermore, the Taylor expansion leading to equation
(4.16) is justiﬁed in this case, since the next term in the expansion of (4.13) would
be order A2/W20 .
Now we tackle the problem of pricing the bits of information: within this for-
malism, it is natural to price information as the diﬀerence in price due to a change
in the probability distribution. When the agent acquire some information Yi, the
probability distribution changes from P (Xi) to P (Xi|Yi). In this case, the calcula-
tion of the price he/she is willing to pay for the asset Xi is computed with the new
conditional probability distribution. Such a price will depend on the speciﬁc value
of the information Yi. We can consider the average of such a price, averaged with
respect to the distribution of Yi, as the price that the investor is willing to pay for
both the asset and the information.
For the cases we are going to consider in our models, the uninformed distribution
P (Xi) is the marginal of the joint distribution P (Xi, Yi). Hence the information on
average does not change the expected return of the asset (E[Xi] = E[E[Xi|Yi]]), but
produces a reduction in variance (V[Xi] 6= E[V[Xi|Yi]]). E[Xi|Yi] and V[Xi|Yi] are the
conditional cumulants, expected value and variance, at ﬁxed Yi. As such, they are
function of Yi and they can be averaged with respect to the information probability
distribution P (Yi), as we did in the previous equations in brackets.
In this setup, the fair price that the investor is willing to pay for the information
Yi, is given by the diﬀerence in price among the two following cases; the case in which
he/she buys the asset and the information, and the one in which he/she buys only
the asset. Hence the price of the information per unit of asset A = 1, can be given
by
δpi = α (V[Xi]− E [V[Xi |Yi]]) = αV [E[Xi |Yi]] , (4.17)
where in the last equality we used the variance decomposition formula (V[Xi] =
E [V[Xi |Yi]] +V [E[Xi |Yi]]) in order to show that the price of the information is non
negative.
Equation (4.17) can be extended beyond the case of the single asset Xi, and we
can apply this formalism to estimate the price of the information Y associated with
any ﬁnancial transformation F (X) (that can be a homogeneous diversiﬁcation X/n
or an ABS Fk(X)). We get
δp = α (V [F (X)]− E [V [F (X) |Y ] ]) , (4.18)
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as the deﬁnition of the price of the information Y associated with the ﬁnancial in-
strument F (X). This price depends on α, which is an investor-dependent quantity,
which expresses his/her risk aversion. In the following, when we use such a price we
ﬁx α = 1, referring just to the reduction in variance given by the information.
A quite general result can be proven (see appendix 4.A) about this expression for
the class of the models introduced in (4.1) with binary variables. For those model, as
a consequence of the factorizability of the conditional probability P (Xi |Yi), we can
show that for the average return X the following holds
E
[
V [X |Y ]] = E[[V [Xi |Yi] ]
n
. (4.19)
We are going to use this result in the following to understand the behaviour of the
information price, as a function of the size of the pool, for the homogeneous portfolio.
In the next two sections we are going to specialize to two classes of less general
models, symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric models are intended to model stock
price dynamics while asymmetric ones are intended to model those cases where a
negative return is a rare event, e.g. credits.
4.4 A model for symmetric assets (stocks)
In this section we consider a symmetric model of binary variables, i.e. for which{
Xi = ±1
Yi = ±1
{
E[Xi] = 0
E[Yi] = 0
. (4.20)
This type of distributions could arise for instance when dealing with binarized high
frequency ﬁnancial data, where observations are very noisy. In this case, volatil-
ity is much higher that the expected return, hence the binarization yields at ﬁrst
approximation symmetric variables.
When the asset returns are assumed to be independent, so are the information
variables, and the marginals distributions are trivial, i.e P ({Xi}) = P ({Yi}) =
(1/2)N . In this independent returns case, the unique measurable quantity which
is non trivial is E[XiYi], which measure how likely the return is positive (or negative)
when the information is positive (or negative). Since both returns and information
are symmetric, the conditional P (Xi |Yi) can be parametrized in terms of a single
number. For convenience, we use the following parametrization
P (Xi = xi |Yi = yi) = e
Jxiyi
2 cosh(J)
. (4.21)
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Alternatively to J , we can introduce the probability to be aligned, pa =
E[XiYi]+1
2
=
(1 + e−2J)−1, describing how likely each information Yi is equal to the asset return it
is related with.
In the more general case in which the assets returns are not independent and a
non zero empirical measure of E[XiXj] is available, we have to make an assumption
on which distribution of the information P ({Yi}) is compatible with the observed
correlation. We recall that in our setting, equation (4.1), a dependence among returns
emerges as a consequences of a dependence among information. Equation (4.21)
implies E[XiXj] = tanh2(J)E[YiYj] (we refer to appendix 4.D for computational
details), showing explicitly how the asset returns dependence is inherited from the
information dependence. When a single measure of correlation is available, and there
are no reasons to expect inhomogeneities in the system (i.e. we can assume identical
P (Xi|Yi) and {Yi} identically distributed), the most general distribution compatible
with a ﬁxed value of E[YiYj] is a symmetric fully connected Ising model
P ({Yi} = {yi}) = 1Zy e
C
2n
y2 , (4.22)
where y =
∑
i yi. By most general distribution, we mean that this is the distribu-
tion compatible with the observed moments that has the largest entropy (maximum
entropy principle). The independent assets case is recovered when C = 0. The pa-
rameter J is speciﬁed as before by the measurement of E[XiYi] while C can be ﬁxed
by E[YiYj] or equivalently by E[XiXj] = tanh2(J)E[YiYj]. In particular, we note
that the coupling C changes with the size of the pool n - at ﬁxed returns correlation
E[XiXj]. In order to ﬁnd the value of C that corresponds to a given value of the
correlation, for a given n, one has to solve the inverse Ising model, the details of
which are described in the appendix 4.B.
Here we consider ﬁnancial transformations that are functions of the average asset
performance, as discussed in the previous section. Hence it is useful to compute the
joint p.d.f for the sums
X =
n∑
i=1
Xi and Y =
n∑
i=1
Yi. (4.23)
In general we can write this as
P (X = x , Y = y) =
∑
{Xi}
∑
{Yi}
(
n∏
i=1
P (Xi = xi , Yi = yi)
)
δ
(
n∑
i=1
Xi = x
)
δ
(
n∑
i=1
Yi = y
)
,
(4.24)
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but this sum is tricky to compute, because all terms for which the deltas are non
zero, do not have the same weight. Let's consider instead
P (X = x , Y = y ,A = a), (4.25)
where the variable A is the number of aligned binary variables, i.e. for which the
return Xi and its associated Yi have the same sign. In this case all the terms con-
tributing to this probability have the same weight and we can write
P (X = x , Y = y ,A = a) =
eJae−J(n−a)eC/2ny
2
(2 cosh(J))nZY B(x, y, a) . (4.26)
By B(x, y, a) we denote all possible couples of strings of ±1 - of length n - such that
the ﬁrst sum to x, the second to y, in such a way they have a aligned variables.
To compute this number, we start from all strings summing to x, which is
(
n
n+x
2
)
.
Starting from each of these string of {Xi}, we can create a string of {Yi} summing
to y and having a aligned variables with the {Xi} string in the following way. We
initially take {Yi} = {Xi} and then we change sign to 12(n− a− y−x2 ) variables out of
the n+x
2
which are positive in the string {Xi}, and we change sign to 12(n− a+ y−x2 )
variables out of the n−x
2
which are negative.
Hence we get
B(x, y, a) =
(
n
n+x
2
)( n+x
2
1
2
(n− a− y−x
2
)
)( n−x
2
1
2
(n− a+ y−x
2
)
)
. (4.27)
The allowed values of a goes from amin = |x+y2 | to amax = n − |x−y2 |, so that we can
write
P (X = x , Y = y) =
amax∑
a=amin
P (X = x , Y = y, A = a) (4.28)
and we ﬁnally get
P (X = x , Y = y) =
amax∑
a=amin
B(x, y, a)
eJae−J(n−a)e
C
2n
y2
(2 cosh(J))nZY (4.29)
with B(x, y, a) expressed as in equation (4.27). This expression is very useful to
compute numerically all desirable quantities like measures of mutual information
and variances, because it reduces the sum over an exponential (in n) number of
conﬁgurations to the sum over a linear set of states.
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Independent assets and information
We report in this subsection the results obtained for independent assets, when C = 0.
Figure 4.3 shows the mutual information per bit and the price of information for an
homogeneous portfolio against diﬀerent values of J - or pa. With increasing n, the
distributions of X and Y converge to two Gaussian distributions, with correlation
tanh(J), because of the central limit theorem. As a result, the mutual information
reaches a constant value, which is In→∞(X;Y ) = −1/2 log(1− tanh(J)2) [79]. Since
the entropy is growing logarithmically, as it is known that for a binomial distributed
random variableH(X) ' 1/2 log(2pien), the mutual information per bit plotted in the
left panel of ﬁgure 4.3 shows a logarithmic decay to zero. At large n, the knowledge
of the information Y is only weakly informative on the random variable X. An
alternative way to express this loss of information, is by noting that a constant (in
n) mutual information, together with an increasing (in n) entropy H(X), implies
H(X|Y )
H(X)
→ 1 when n→∞, (4.30)
showing how the knowledge of Y does not reduce the entropy of X.
For independent assets, this loss of information is consistent with what observed
on the right panel of ﬁgure 4.3, where the information price is going to zero ∼ 1/n.
This can be understood by recalling that the information price, expressed as in (4.18)
is a diﬀerence between two variances. While the second is decreasing with n in general,
as stated in (4.19), the ﬁrst variance is also having a ∼ 1/n behaviour in the case of
independent assets. In fact, the variance for the average of a set of random variables
can be written as
V [X] =
1
n2
V [X] =
1
n
V [Xi] +
n(n− 1)
n2
cov [XiXj]. (4.31)
When n is very large only the covariance term is not going to zero. However, in the
case of independent returns, it is exactly zero for all n.
The general picture emerging from ﬁgure 4.3 is that the return of a large homo-
geneous portfolio of independent assets, is only weakly dependent on information. In
other words, risks (even unknown ones, since we neglect relevant bits of information)
can be eﬃciently diversiﬁed.
This indeed is the perfect realization of the diversiﬁcation task, namely safe ﬁ-
nancial products can be easily created and they prove to be stable with respect to a
change in the market fundamentals. In such a world, it can be expected to see that
information has no value, and both buyers and sellers do not have an incentive in
building nor buying barcodes for ﬁnancial products.
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Figure 4.3: Independent assets, homogeneous portfolio X. Diﬀerent curves correspond to
data for pa = 0.75(J = 0.5493), 0.8(J = 0.69315), 0.85(J = 0.8673). The mutual informa-
tion per bit dependence on n shows a logarithmic decay to zero. Correspondingly, the price
of the information goes to zero proportional to 1/n. In the curves with larger value of J ,
(or with larger pa), as expected the information is more relevant and has higher price.
Figure 4.4 shows the same plots for an ABS. For the ABS, we ﬁxed k in such a
way that, by changing n, the default probability pd = P (Fk(X) = −1) is constant,
namely we studied the size eﬀect on a given tranche. In the case of independent
assets, being X normally distributed at large n, this could be achieved by having
k ∼ √n (since X = nN (0, 1)). In particular, in order to have pd = 0.01 we can
ﬁx k = −2.326√n. In general, when dependencies are included in the model, this
inversion is not a trivial task, so in ﬁgure 4.4 we ﬁx k numerically, to be the smallest
value with a default probability larger than 0.01. Oscillation are observed at small n,
due to the fact that the ABS return function distinguishes only even integer values
of k, so that it is not possible to ﬁx pd at the same value for small n.
At variance with the case of the homogeneous portfolio, both the mutual informa-
tion per bit and the information price go to a constant value. This implies that, for
an ABS, the information remains informative about the return on the product and,
consistently, the price of such information does not vanish.
For structured ﬁnance type of products, like the simple ABS studied here, even
at the level of independent and symmetric assets the diversiﬁcation task does not
work: the process of securitisation does not diversify enough to make the information
negligible. Therefore, the information stored in the Y variable remains relevant, irre-
spectively of the size n of the pool of assets involved. Such collective transformations
introduce a systemic source of risk that is sensible to the side information Y and that,
therefore, cannot be eﬃciently hedged neglecting Y . In such a case it is meaningful to
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think that a barcode, containing the value of Y , could be sold together with a tranche
Fk(X), and the price of such a barcode could be expressed by the information price
(4.18), quantifying the reduction of risk that is on average achieved, when the value
of Y is known.
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Figure 4.4: Independent assets, ABS Fk(X). Diﬀerent curves correspond to data for pa =
0.75(J = 0.5493), 0.8(J = 0.69315), 0.85(J = 0.8673). k is ﬁxed to be the smallest value
of with a default probability larger than 0.01. Both the mutual information per bit and
the information price go to a constant value, initial oscillation are there because of the
impossibility to ﬁx k realizing a precise value of pd when n is small.
Dependent assets and information
In this subsection, we discuss the results for dependent assets. In ﬁgure 4.6 we can see
mutual information per bit and the information price for an homogeneous portfolio.
Both plots are for a ﬁxed value of J = 0.5493 (corresponding to pa = 0.75 ) and
the diﬀerent curves correspond to diﬀerent values of ρ = E[XiXj], or equivalently
E[YiYj] = tanh−2(J) ρ = 4 ρ. This choice is dictated by the observation that both the
mutual information per bit and the information price are always increasing in J (or
in pa), while the dependence on the correlation is less trivial. For each value of ρ at a
given pool size n, the value of C is computed by the numerical inversion of the Ising
model at ﬁnite n.
On the left panel we show the behaviour of the mutual information per bit, where
all curves eventually reaches a logarithmically decreasing regime, but comparing to
the independent assets case, this value is much larger and it is not attained up to
very large values of n. In particular, for diﬀerent values of ρ, the behaviour is not
trivial, and for curves corresponding to smaller value of ρ the mutual information per
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bit is larger, when the pool size n is larger than a given amount. This property can
be understood in terms of the behaviour of the mutual information, which is growing
logarithmically only when C = 1, whereas it reaches a constant value for all values
of C > 1, as discussed in appendix 4.C. Since weakly correlated assets (hence weakly
correlated information) are asymptotically described by a model with C closer to 1
than strongly correlated assets(see appendix 4.B), their mutual information is larger
at large n, and so is the mutual information per bit.
In the right panel of ﬁgure 4.5, we show the behaviour of the price of the infor-
mation. The discussion after equation (4.31) is still valid except that here assets are
not independent, hence the covariance term is not zero. Each curve is asymptotic to
the value of ρ = E[XiXj] which is ﬁxed for all n.
A non trivial observation is that here the mutual information per bit and the infor-
mation price exhibit a diﬀerent monotonicity in ρ. In fact, the weaker the correlation
among assets returns, the more the information is relevant for large portfolios (when
looking at the mutual information per bit), while on the contrary the information
price is a decreasing function of this correlation. This is because while the informa-
tion price asymptotically converges to the value of ρ, the mutual information strongly
depends on the assumption on how the dependence among information is modelled,
in particular here on (4.22). Its behaviour as a function of n and its asymptotic value
is dictated by some speciﬁc properties of the inverse Ising model.
Figure 4.6 shows the same for an ABS. For ABSs, the introduction of depen-
dences does not change the main qualitative picture of the case of independent asset,
meaning that both the mutual information per bit and the information price go to
a constant value. This convergence is slower for curves with smaller values of ρ,
due to the slow convergence of the inverse Ising. A non-monotonic behaviour, sim-
ilar to what observed for the homogeneous portfolio is observed also here, and the
non-monotonicity extends also to the information price; for products composed with
weakly dependent assets the information is more relevant then for products composed
with strongly dependent assets, both at the level of entropy reduction and at the level
of risk reduction.
4.5 A model for asymmetric assets (credits)
In this section we consider models with binary and homogeneous variables, but we
drop the symmetric assumption. In this case, the most general model compatible
Lost in Diversiﬁcation 79
0 500 1000 1500 2000
n
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
m
u
tu
al
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
p
er
b
it
ρ = 0.0
ρ = 0.025
ρ = 0.05
ρ = 0.1
0 500 1000 1500 2000
n
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
p
ri
ce
of
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ρ = 0.0
ρ = 0.025
ρ = 0.05
ρ = 0.1
Figure 4.5: Dependent assets, homogeneous portfolio X. All curves correspond to pa =
0.75(J = 0.5493) and diﬀerent values of ρ = E[XiXj ] = 0.1, 0.05, 0.025, 0.0. The value of
C is computed by the numerical inversion of the Ising model at ﬁnite n corresponding to a
given value of E[YiYj ], and C = 0 for the curve at ρ = 0, which is shown for comparison.
On the left the behaviour of the mutual information per bit, which eventually reaches
a logarithmically decreasing regime. In the n−range showed in the plot only the curves
corresponding to ρ = 0.4 and 0.2 have reached this regime. On the right the behaviour of
the price of the information. Each curve is asymptotic to the value of ρ which is ﬁxed for
all n.
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Figure 4.6: Dependent assets, ABS Fk(X). All curves correspond to pa = 0.75 and diﬀerent
values of ρ = E[XiXj ] = 0.1, 0.05, 0.025, 0.0. The value of C is computed by the numerical
inversion of the Ising model at ﬁnite n corresponding to a given value of E[YiYj ], and C = 0
for the curve at ρ = 0, which is shown for comparison. The tranches correspond to k ﬁxed
to be the smallest value of with a default probability larger than 0.01.
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with the maximum entropy principle would be speciﬁed by:
P (Xi = xi |Yi = yi) = e
Jxiyi+H1xi
2 cosh(Jyi +H1)
, (4.32)
and by
P ({Yi} = {yi}) = 1Zy e
C
2n
y2+H2y. (4.33)
Given the larger number of parameters involved, we might consider two simpler cases;
H1 = 0, in which the anisotropy in returns is obtained as a result of anisotropic
information or the case in which H2 = 0, in which information are still symmetric
and the anisotropy is imposed in the conditional P (Xi |Yi). We are going to focus here
only the latter case, because asymmetric information variables are not particularly
meaningful. In particular, they are not meaningful in all cases in which information
is not binary and it is binarized a posteriori. In these cases in fact, the only practical
argument to perform the binarization, is to maximize the informative content of
information H({Yi}), as symmetric binary variables do.
Analogously to the symmetric case, we compute the joint p.d.f for sums, resulting
in
P (X = x , Y = y) =
amax∑
a=amin
B(x, y, a)
eJae−J(n−a)e
C
2n
y2+H1x+H2y
2n cosh(J +H1)(n+y)/2 cosh(J −H1)(n−y)/2ZY
(4.34)
with B(x, y, a) expressed as in equation (4.27).
We are going to report here only results about dependent asset, since indepen-
dent are not showing any new behaviour. In ﬁgure 4.8 the behaviour of the mutual
information and the information price are shown as a function of n. The parameters
J and H1 are ﬁxed once for all, from measurement of E[Xi] and E[XiYi]. In fact, in
the case H2 = 0 the generic form of single returns correlations, as explicitly shown in
appendix 4.D, are given by
E[Xi] =
1
2
[tanh(H1 + J) + tanh(H1 − J)] (4.35)
E[XiXj] =
(
1 + E[YiYj]
4
)(
tanh2(H1 + J) + tanh
2(H1 − J)
)
+ (4.36)
+
(
1− E[YiYj]
2
)
tanh(H1 + J) tanh(H1 − J)
E[XiYi] =
exp(J +H1)
2 cosh(J +H1)
+
exp(J −H1)
2 cosh(J −H1) − 1. (4.37)
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Fixing E[Xi] = 0.96 and E[XiYi] = 0.02 (with symmetric Yis and strongly biased
Xis, E[XiYi] has to be small) and inverting the ﬁrst and third of the previous equa-
tions, we get J ' 0.27976 and H1 ' 2.0178. With these values of J and H1, the
correlation among asset returns ρ =
E[XiXj ]−E[Xi]2
1−E[Xi]2 results to be still 4 times smaller
than the information correlations E[YiYj], like in the symmetric case.
Figure 4.7 and ﬁgure 4.8 show the usual plots for an homogeneous portfolio and
for the ABS. They conﬁrm essentially the picture emerging from the analysis of asset
with symmetric returns. In ﬁgure 4.7 the regime in which the mutual information per
bit decrease with n is not reached up to n = 2048 for all curves. The same behaviour
for the price of information is also found.
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Figure 4.7: Dependent assets, homogeneous portfolio X. All curves correspond to E[Xi] =
0.96 and E[XiYi] = 0.02 (J ' 0.27976 and H1 ' 2.0178) and diﬀerent values of ρ =
0.1, 0.05, 0.025, 0.0. The value of C is computed by the numerical inversion of the Ising model
at ﬁnite n corresponding to a given value of E[YiYj ] = 4ρ, while C = 0.0 for independent
assets. On the left the behaviour of the mutual information per bit, which eventually reaches
a logarithmically decreasing regime, but in the n−range showed in the plot not a single curve
has reached this regime. On the right the behaviour of the price of the information. Each
curve is asymptotic to the value of E[XiXj ] = 0.0016ρ, which is ﬁxed for all n.
4.6 Conclusions and outlook
In this ﬁnal chapter, we exploited information theoretic concepts and asset pricing
theory to investigate the lack of transparency associated with ﬁnancial transforma-
tions, which is widely spread in nowadays ﬁnancial practices and it had a predominant
role in the 2007-2008 global ﬁnancial crisis.
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Figure 4.8: Dependent assets, ABS Fk(X). All curves correspond to E[Xi] = 0.96
and E[XiYi] = 0.02 (J ' 0.27976 and H1 ' 2.0178) and diﬀerent values of ρ =
0.1, 0.05, 0.025, 0.0. The value of C is computed by the numerical inversion of the Ising
model at ﬁnite n corresponding to a given value of E[YiYj ] = 4ρ, while C = 0.0 for inde-
pendent assets. On the left the behaviour of the mutual information per bit, on the right
the behaviour of the price of the information. The tranches correspond to k ﬁxed to be the
smallest value of with a default probability larger than 0.1.
In an ideal world in which asset returns are independent between each other,
standard diversiﬁcation techniques, like the homogeneous portfolio considered here,
allow investors to trade safe ﬁnancial products, and whose low risk proﬁle is stable
with respect to ﬂuctuations in market fundamentals. A very simple principle, which is
based on increasing the size of the pool, can be eﬃciently used to generate instruments
with a risk as low as desired.
When instead dependencies among returns are taken into account, or when more
involved ﬁnancial products like structured securitisations are considered, such a di-
versiﬁcation dream drastically collapses.
In ABSs, the risk can be eﬃciently hedged by moving the threshold and low risk
instruments can be created out of risky assets. However, such an evaluation is ex-
tremely unstable. In our model, stability is considered with respect to the acquisition
of additionally variables, containing information about the distributions of returns.
We explicitly show how in these cases the knowledge of the information remains rel-
evant for the return distribution, both at the level of entropy and at the level of risk,
up to very large pools.
The model is motivated by the recent history of the bubble in the subprime mort-
gage backed securities market, which was nourished by the lack of transparency of
structured ﬁnance products. [28] [69]. Our results highlight the importance of the
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proposal [29] to build an eﬃcient and standardized system, or a common language,
though which information should be easily available to all market participants. In
addition, we proposed a way to price such a ﬁnancial barcode, through the risk reduc-
tion due to the information. Such an aspect is particularly relevant, since without a
barcode price the seller does not have an incentive for sharing the information with
the buyer, and the system is not sustainable.
In the case of homogeneous portfolios, while the actual informative content of the
information about the whole distribution of returns, the mutual information per bit,
depends on the speciﬁcities of how dependencies are introduced in the model, the
barcode price does not. In particular, when a fully connected Ising model is used to
model information dependencies, the information Y remains informative up to very
large portfolios and asymptotically is more informative for weakly dependent assets,
whose distribution's parameters are closer to the critical point. This implies that a
bit of information is more valuable when the correlations are weak.
This suggests that measures of correlations, which are usually rather noisy and
unreliable, are not suﬃcient to understand risk in an environment of complex ﬁnancial
products, but understanding how the returns actually depend on each others is of
fundamental need. Eventually, this suggest that that the barcode might include, on
top of the actual value of Y , which gives information on the average quality of the
assets {Xi}, also details about the probability distributions of future returns of these
{Xi}.
Our simpliﬁed scheme highlights those crucial issues and might be a benchmark
for more complex and realistic theoretical models, e.g. with continuous returns as well
as a benchmark for the implementation of such barcodes in real ﬁnancial practices,
in particular from the point of view of the regulator. In general, it highlights how
systemic lack of transparency in Finance should be considered a key ingredient to
compute risk.
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4.A The conditional variance
We prove here that the result (4.19), namely
E
[
V
[
X
n
| Y
]]
=
E [V [Xi | Yi ]]
n
(4.38)
is very general and it can be proven for all the models of binary variables we have
introduced.
To compute this variance we use
V
[
X
n
| Y
]
=
1
n2
V [X | Y ] (4.39)
and we calculate separately E [X | Y ] and E [X2 | Y ]. For the ﬁrst we have
E [X | Y ] = nE [Xi | Y ]
= n
∑
Yi
E [Xi | Yi ]P (Yi |Y ) . (4.40)
We note in that the last equation we can write
E [Xi | Yi ] = a+ bYi (4.41)
because this is just a diﬀerent parametrization (using a and b instead of J and H1),
and
P (Yi |Y ) = n+ YiY
2n
. (4.42)
Using those we easily get
E [X | Y ] = na+ bY. (4.43)
Similarly we can write for
E
[
X2 | Y ] = n+ n (n− 1)E [XiXj | Y ]
= n+ n (n− 1)
∑
Yi,Yj
E [XiXj | Yi, Yj ]P (Yi, Yj |Y )
= n+ n (n− 1)
a2 + 2abY
n
+ b2
∑
Yi,Yj
YiYjP (Yi, Yj |Y )

= n+ n (n− 1)
[
a2 +
2abY
n
+ b2
(
Y 2 − n
n2 − n
)]
. (4.44)
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Putting everything together we get
V [X | Y ] = (1− a
2 − b2)
n
− 2ab
n
Y, (4.45)
hence
E
[
V
[
X
n
| Y
]]
=
(1− a2 − b2)
n
− 2ab
n
E[Y ]. (4.46)
We observe that, being E [Xi | Yi ] = a+ bYi we have
E [V [Xi | Yi ]] = 1− a2 − b2 − 2abE[Yi], (4.47)
hence the equation is proved in general.
4.B Fully connected Ising model, direct and inverse problems
The fully connected Ising model for a set of binary variables {Yi} is deﬁned by the
partition function
Z(C,H, n) =
∑
{Yi}
exp
{
C
2n
Y 2 +HY
}
=
∑
Y
B(Y ) exp
{
C
2n
Y 2 +HY
}
, (4.48)
where Y is a shortcut for Y =
∑
Yi and
B(Y ) ≡
(
n
n+Y
2
)
(4.49)
is the number of conﬁguration {Yi} summing to Y .
From this partition function, diﬀerent moments of the distributions such as E[Yi]
or E[YiYj] can be computed numerically for ﬁnite n, and analytically in the large
n limit. We refer to this problem as the direct Ising problem. The inverse Ising
problem, instead, is the determination of C and H that provide a given value for
some observed moments of the distribution.
Both these problems are amenable to an approximated solution in the large n limit.
To account for the quadratic term we can use a Hubbard Stratonovich transformation
exp
{
C
2n
Y 2
}
=
√
nC
2pi
∫
dm exp
{
−nC
2
m2 + CYm
}
, (4.50)
and use such transformation to rewrite the partition function and get
Z(C,H, n) =
√
nC
2pi
∫
dmenf(m) (4.51)
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with
f(m) = log(2)− C
2
m2 + log [cosh (Cm+H)] . (4.52)
In the large n limit, the previous integral can be computed with the use of the
saddle point method. The maximum of the function f(m) is located in the point m∗,
determined by the saddle point equation
f ′(m∗) = 0 =⇒ m∗ = tanh(Cm∗ +H), (4.53)
and the integral can be approximated to be
Z(C,H, n) '
√
nC
2pi
enf(m
∗)
∫
dmenf
′′(m∗) (m−m∗)2
2
. (4.54)
The second derivative f ′′(m∗) can be computed and it is equal to
f ′′(m∗) = −C + C2 (1−m∗2) . (4.55)
There are two subtleties associated with the previous approximation when H =
0, because the equation (4.53) may have more than one solution and the second
derivatives can be null. Speciﬁcally, the second derivative is null on the critical point
{H = 0 , C = 1}, separating a phase where equation (4.53) has only one solution
(m∗ = 0 in the region {H = 0 , C < 1}) to a phase where equation (4.53) has three
solutions (m∗ = {0,±m∗} in the region {H = 0 , C > 1}).
We discuss the case of H = 0 separately, also because we have in mind to apply
this case to the case of symmetric information.
In this case, if C ≥ 1, equation (4.53) has three solution, 0 and two ±m∗ corre-
sponding to two separate global maxima of the function f(m). Furthermore, in the
special case C = 1, the second derivative f ′′(m∗) is null, and the ﬁrst derivative which
is non-zero is the fourth one. Hence, to have a convergent integral in equation (4.54)
additional terms in the power expansion have to be added.
Using the two famous integrals∫ ∞
−∞
dx e−x
2
=
√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
dx e−x
4
= 2 Γ
(
5
4
)
, (4.56)
we have that for large n
Z(C,H = 0, n) '

1√
1−C 2
n if C < 1
2nn1/4121/4
√
2/pi Γ
(
5
4
)
if C = 1
1√
1−C(1−m∗2)e
nf(m∗) if C > 1
. (4.57)
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From the partition function we can compute the correlation ρ = E[YiYj] for large n
by using
ρ = E[YiYj] =
1
n(n− 1)E[Y
2]− 1
n− 1 '
1
n2
1
Z
2n
d
dC
Z − 1
n
, (4.58)
and we get
ρ = E[YiYj] ∼

α1
1
n
if C < 1
α2
1√
n
if C = 1
m∗2 + α3
n
if C > 1
(4.59)
where α1, α1 and α3 are some constants. The results in equation (4.59) can be used
to understand the inverse problem in the large n limit. If we want to ﬁnd the value of
the coupling C that is providing a given value of correlation ρ, the value of C has to
be larger than 1, because C < 1 is compatible only with ρ = 0 in the n → ∞ limit.
The speciﬁc value of C(ρ) reached in the n→∞ limit can be obtained by inverting
the equation ρ = m∗2, that in the H = 0 case gives
C(ρ)→ tanh
−1√ρ√
ρ
for n→∞. (4.60)
Such inversion can be obtained also numerically, inverting the equation that provides
a given ρ at ﬁnite n, and the result is shown in ﬁgure (4.9).
4.C Large n behaviour of the mutual information
The deﬁnition of the mutual information reads
I(X;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X). (4.61)
An upper bound for the mutual information is given by the entropy H(Y ) of the
distribution of Y .
In ﬁgure 4.10 it is shown the behaviour of the entropy H(Y ) when the variables
{Yi} are distributed according to a fully connected Ising model (4.33). It is observed
to be growing proportionally to 1/2 log(n) for all values except for C = 1 and H2 = 0
where the slope is steeper and it can be observed to be 3/4 log(n). This can be
understood in terms of the moments in equation (4.59). For all values except for
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Figure 4.9: Numerical inversion of the fully connected Ising model, as a function of n. The
exact expression for ρ = E[YiYj ] as a function of C and n is numerically inverted (Newton's
method), obtaining C for several values of n and ρ. Asymptotically, C converges to the
limit
tanh−1√ρ√
ρ .
C = 1 and H2 = 0 the variance of Y is proportional to n, while on the critical point
it is going as n3/4. Given that at large n, the Ising spins are essentially independent
(E[YiYj]−E2[Yi] ' 0), the entropy is expected to be logarithmic in the variance V[Y ],
as for a Normal distribution.
In ﬁgure 4.10 it is shown the behaviour of the mutual information I(X;Y ), when
the {Xi} and the {Yi} variables are distributed according to (4.32) and (4.33). It is
observed to be constant at large n for all values except for C = 1, H1 = 0 and H2 = 0,
where it is observed to grow like (1/4) log(n). This can be understood in terms of
the entropy discussed above, since only at the critical point and when H1 = 0 the
diﬀerence of the two terms in equation (4.61) is not cancelling the logarithmic term.
4.D Empirical averages against model's parameters
Here we derive the relations among empirical averages and model's parameters, in the
general case considered in the main text with binary variables distributed according
to equations (4.32) and (4.22). The simple trick for the calculation is using the law of
iterated expectations conditioning on information and then exploiting the conditional
independence of the assets, as we assumed in our model. For the symmetric case we
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Figure 4.10: H(Y ) growth as a function of n in a linear-log plot. The slope is asymptotically
1/2 for all values except for C = 1 and H2 = 0, while it is 3/4 on the critical point.
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Figure 4.11: I(X;Y ) growth as a function of n in a linear-log plot. Asymptotically, for all
values except for C = 1 and H1 = H2 = 0 the mutual information converges to a constant,
while it grows as (1/4) log(n) on the critical point.
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have:
E[XiXj] = E[E[XiXj|Yi, Yj]] = E
[(
eJYi − e−JYi) (eJYj − e−JYj)
4 cosh(J) cosh(J)
]
=
=
1
4
E
[
(2 tanh2(J))P (Yi = Yj)+
+ (tanh(J)2)(1− P (Yi = Yj))
]
.
This is exactly the expression reported in the main text since E[YiYj] = 2P (Yi =
Yj)−1. For the asymmetric model, with H2 = 0 the expected value of an asset reads:
E[Xi] = E[E[Xi|Yi]] = E
[
eJYi+H1 − e−JYi−H1
2 cosh(JYi +H1)
]
=
=
1
2
tanh[J +H1] +
1
2
tanh[H1 − J ],
while the relation involving the expected value of the product of asset returns reads:
E[XiXj] = E[E[XiXj|Yi, Yj]] = E
[(
eJYi+H1 − e−JYi−H1) (eJYj+H1 − e−JYj−H1)
4 cosh(JYi +H1) cosh(JYj +H1)
]
=
=
1
4
E
[
(tanh2(J +H1) + tanh
2(J −H1))P (Yi = Yj)+
+ (tanh(J +H1) tanh(J −H1))(1− P (Yi = Yj))] .
This is exactly the expression (4.35) since E[YiYj] = 2P (Yi = Yj) − 1. Finally the
correlation among assets and information is related through model's parameters by:
E[XiYi] = E [YiE[Xi|Yi]] = E
[
Yi
eJYi+H1 − e−JYi−H1
2 cosh(JYi +H1)
]
=
=
1
2
tanh[J +H1]− 1
2
tanh[H1 − J ].
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Concluding Remarks
Today's global economy is more interconnected and complex than ever, and seems out
of any particular institution's control. The diversity of markets and traded products,
the complexity of their structure and regulation, make it a daunting challenge to
understand behaviours, predict trends or prevent systemic crises.
The standard approach of Economics, that mostly aims at explaining global be-
haviour in terms of perfectly rational actors and eﬃcient markets, has largely failed
[8, 80]. Some alternative approaches, inspired by Statistical Physics and the Complex
Systems Science, in which economic phenomena are considered as emergent statistical
properties of a large interacting system, and empirical evidences are favoured over
mathematical idealizations, can be of great help in dealing with this challenge.
The perspective lying below these approaches describes the economy, likewise an
ecological system, as a complex adaptive system. That is, according to the deﬁnition
in reference [81], a system [. . .] composed of individual agents that adjust their
behavior or their relative number, with consequences for the system as a whole, and
these consequences can in turn aﬀect individual behaviors . As a result, the economy
turns out to be extremely interconnected, a perturbation in a given sector will have
consequences on other far related sectors, and these consequences in turn will aﬀect
the initial perturbation, possibly amplifying it.
In this thesis, few issues hampering the sustainability of the economic and ﬁnancial
systems have been considered and analyzed with the methods of Statistical Physics:
the anomalous size of ﬁnancial institutions and ﬁnancial regulation, the trend of
rising inequalities and growth, market eﬃciency and the systemic ﬁnancial risk. The
general idea of this thesis, lying behind the mere models, is that these problems are
all deeply interconnected.
Quantitative models, when properly conceived, have the great merit of exposing
these interconnections, unravelling the complexity of a large variety of natural and
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social phenomena. In these respect, economic and social systems are sources of a very
large number of interesting problems lacking a satisfactory understanding, a number
that evolves together with society itself, because it is intimately connected to the
increasing complexity of existing networks and their structure [82].
In the words of Bialek, an ambitious goal for future scientists can be described as
[. . .] reconcile the physicists' desire for concise, unifying theoretical principles with
the obvious complexity and diversity of life [83]. The present work wishes to be a
humble contribution in this direction.
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